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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation was to conduct an outcomes-based program
evaluation for the Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola) campus of the New Orleans
Baptist Theological Seminary. The study included one primary research question, with
two subquestions. The primary research question asked to what extent students in the
program developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating
students and preparing them for effective ministry. The first subquestion asked whether
statistically significant differences existed in the moral reasoning of students of different
class years. The second subquestion asked whether statistically significant differences
existed in the moral reasoning of students of different personality types.
A cross-sectional study was conducted with students during the fall of 2005 using
the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)
instruments. All 101 program students were invited to participate in the study. To provide
a benchmark for student scores, 30 Seminary faculty members were asked to complete
the DIT-2. The student response rates were 94% for the DIT-2 instrument and 97% for
the MBTI instrument. The response rate for faculty was 20%.
After removing two outliers from the freshmen class, statistically significant
differences were found in the principled moral reasoning scores (P scores) of freshmen
(m = 22.146, sd = 12.002) and juniors (m = 30.274, sd = 13.165). No significant
differences were found in moral reasoning based upon personality types. The mean P
score among faculty members was 34.02 (sd = 15.25). In response to the primary
research question, it was determined student scores did show moral reasoning differences
iii

consistent with the program goals. Conclusions reached in this study were limited
because of the cross-sectional design. Further research is necessary before conclusions
may be generalized beyond the sample.
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CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM AND ITS CLARIFYING COMPONENTS

The Angola College Program
In 2004, the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola (LSP) was the nation’s largest
prison, housing more than 5,100 inmates. Every inmate was either convicted of a violent
felony or classified as a habitual offender; the average Angola inmate was sentenced to
88 years (Frink, 2004; “Confronting recidivism,” 2005). Of the inmates at LSP, 90%
were expected to never leave the prison (Severson, 2004).
In the early 1990s, college programs existed in hundreds of prisons across the
country. These programs relied heavily upon federal financial aid funding, such as Pell
grants. Congress cut funding for prison education, however, in 1995 (Karpowitz &
Kenner, n.d.). During the conservative attempts to restructure government, many
lawmakers viewed tax funded prisoner education as a poor investment (Nelson, 1995).
When the federal government cut Higher Education Act funding for educational
rehabilitation programs, Angola’s Warden, Burl Cain, began thinking of new ways to
educate prisoners (Frink, 2004). Partnering with the Judson Baptist Association,
Louisiana Baptist Convention, and the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary
(NOBTS), Cain brought a privately funded theological education to the prison (Baker,
2000).
In 1995, a partnership between NOBTS and LSP created a college program
offering associate and bachelor’s degrees to prison inmates. Associate degrees were first
1

awarded in 1998, and the first bachelor’s degrees were awarded in 2000 (Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2000). In 2004, LSP was the only prison in
the United States offering college degrees to inmates (Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections, 2001). The LSP campus of NOBTS was one of 16 Seminary
extension centers and was regionally accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools (Frink, 2004).
In 1997, the program’s capacity was just 50 students (Moore, 1997). There were
104 students enrolled in 2000 (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections,
2000). By 2004, the program enrolled more than 120 students. Even with increased
enrollment space available, the number of applicants exceeded the number of students the
program was able to enroll (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections,
n.d.a). The popularity of the LSP Seminary was quite different than what Walsh (2000)
had observed in other prisoner education programs. Walsh (2000) found prisoner
education programs did not typically generate significant interest from prisoners.
Because the program had been sectarian in nature, admission required at least one
year of active involvement in one of the prison’s religious communities (Achord &
Moore, 1998). While the Seminary was a Christian institution, Muslims had been
admitted to the program. All LSP seminarians were required to possess a high school
diploma or GED (Severson, 2004). The admission requirements were similar to those of
students enrolled in the program on NOBTS’s main campus.
Once admitted to the Seminary, each inmate had the option of earning an
associate or bachelor’s degree in Christian Ministry (Louisiana Department of Public
2

Safety and Corrections, n.d.b). Students attended classes full-time and enrolled in 15
hours per semester. The program had even expanded to allow students to perform
internships served with previous Seminary graduates. To be eligible for internships,
students must have been in the senior year of the bachelor’s program. At the time of this
study, Angola reportedly had 67 program graduates and interns around the prison
(Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, n.d.b).
Graduates were credited with having a positive impact on the prison community
and had been involved in numerous churches (Moore, 1997). There was even a Christian
radio station, JLSP 91.7, “Incarceration Station,” within the prison. Because of the
success, the Angola Seminary had begun sending missionaries to other prisons. The
missionary program allowed graduates to leave the maximum security LSP and relocate
for two years to another Louisiana correctional institution (Severson, 2004).
The LSP Seminary had been a pioneering effort. While many other correctional
institutions had routinely offered religious programs, LSP was unique in offering
bachelor’s degrees, seminary degrees and in sending inmate missionaries to other
institutions. With 90 inmate-missionaries, the program had been rather extensive
(Severson, 2004).
A primary goal of the Seminary had been the moral development of students.
Warden Cain had said, “I wish other prison wardens could realize what we learned—that
the only rehabilitation is moral rehabilitation” (Frink, 2004, p. 39). Robert Toney, a
chaplain at Angola, also emphasized the moral nature of the Seminary program in his
statement that “moral rehabilitation is the only rehabilitation that works. If you just have
3

education, what you have done is just created a smarter criminal. The change must come
from within” (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005, p. 108).
Moral development had been an integral part of the NOBTS curriculum. The
Seminary designed its curriculum around five “core values.” These values were doctrinal
integrity, spiritual vitality, mission focus, characteristic excellence, and servant
leadership (Academic catalog, 2005-2006, p. 2). According to Dr. Timothy Searcy, the
Seminary’s Director of Institutional Effectiveness (personal communication, June 25,
2005), ethics had been a feature of each of the core values.
The Angola program was credited with creating social and moral change among
the inmate population. In a prison where violence was an almost everyday occurrence in
the 1990s, violence in 2005 was quite rare. While LSP was once known as the nation’s
most dangerous prison, no murders had occurred there since 1999 (Baker, 2002). One
inmate described the Seminary’s effect by saying, “I can now lay down at night and not
worry about what my neighbor is going to do to me or anything like that” (Severson,
2004, paragraph 9).
According to Angola’s Chaplain Toney, Angola had transformed from “the most
violent prison in America” to “the safest prison in America.” The frequency of violent
crimes at LSP had shown a steady decline since the Seminary began its program. The rate
of violence in Angola dropped by approximately 90% between 1996 and 2004
(“Confronting recidivism,” 2005, p. 108). Murders and suicides completely disappeared
from the prison (Baker, 2002). The safer atmosphere at Angola was compared to what
Warden Cain remembered from a prior decade. “I was getting called every week when I
4

was first warden here. We had murders, we had escapes, we had suicides—loss of
hope…” (Severson, 2004, paragraph 3). Speaking at a graduation of LSP seminarians,
Dr. Chuck Kelley, NOBTS president, explained the moral underpinning of the
Seminary’s mission in his statement that “God is willing to exchange our evil for his
good” (Achord & Moore, 1998, paragraph 5).
The Louisiana Department of Corrections attributed much of the change at LSP to
the Seminary. According to the Department website on rehabilitation and work programs,
“The prison in its previous unhealthy condition was known for its violence and frequent
escape attempts. Currently, Angola displays a peaceful and safe environment, which is
the best evidence of a successful, healthy religious program” (Louisiana Department of
Public Safety and Corrections, n.d.b, paragraph 9).
Cain viewed faith-based efforts as the most promising development in criminal
rehabilitation. He said, “nothing else but [the religious programs] should get the credit
[for Angola’s change]. We always had the educational programs. The only thing we did
different was we brought God to Angola” (Frink, 2002, p. 39). The program was
considered such a success in 2004 that wardens from prisons in other states were asking
NOBTS to consider opening campuses at their prisons (Myers, 2004). Later that year,
NOBTS opened a new campus at the Mississippi State Penitentiary and the Seminary
began developing programs in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama (Myers, 2005).
The creation and operation of the Angola Seminary was not easy. Some Louisiana
legislators opposed the program (Frink, 2002). The American Civil Liberties Union
challenged the program (Severson, 2004). Warden Cain was warned by other correctional
5

leaders the program would be dangerous. In describing the mindset of the correctional
community, Cain said, “They told me that one inmate cannot have any power over
another. Therefore he can’t preach or even lead a Bible study” (Frink, 2002, p. 37).

Purpose
The purpose of this study was to conduct a program evaluation for the Seminary
at LSP. Specifically, this study was designed to evaluate the program’s affect on the
moral development of students at LSP. An attempt was made to include a census of all
students in the LSP Seminary population.
The evaluation of the Seminary at LSP was important as national policy continued
to emphasize faith-based initiatives and also led to the United States having the highest
incarceration rate of any nation in the world (Mauer, 2003). The study of moral
development was a salient issue for the American public as well (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma
& Bebeau, 1999). From the frames of higher education, political science and criminal
justice scholarship, this evaluation may help researchers, administrators, policy makers
and bureaucrats make more informed and effective decisions. This evaluation may serve
social scientists and philosophers in terms of advancing their understanding of the social,
psychological and spiritual development of human beings.
Despite the relevance of this program to so many fields of scholarship, this
researcher could not find any previously published studies concerning the Seminary at
LSP. Searches were conducted through a variety of databases, including Dissertation
Abstracts, ERIC, Professional Development Collection and Academic Search Premier.
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Searcy (personal communication, June 25, 2005) confirmed no systematic evaluation had
been conducted exclusively for the LSP Seminary program. This program evaluation
stood to fill an important gap in scholarship.
According to the US Department of Justice, program evaluations could be
classified as either process-based, or outcomes-based. A process-based evaluation aids
stakeholders in understanding the program operation for the purpose of replicating the
program. An outcomes-based evaluation is intended to determine whether the program is
meeting its goals (U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994). An outcomes-based program
evaluation model was used for this study.

Primary Research Question
To what extent do students in the NOBTS program at LSP develop moral
judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for
effective ministry?
a. What, if any, statistically significant differences exist in the moral
judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary
students?
b. What, if any, statistically significant relationships exist between the moral
judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types?

7

Methodology

Population
During the fall 2005 semester, the LSP Seminary program enrolled 101 students.
Because the population was relatively small and the measurement instruments allowed
groups to be evaluated at reasonable costs, the entire program population was invited to
participate in the study. The DIT and DIT-2 required moderate reading levels (Rest,
Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). Consequently, the use of a control group was
determined to be impractical. Appropriate reading levels could not be assured for any
random group of prisoners outside the college program.
While an attempt was made to include a census of the population, all participants
were informed of their rights, including the right to not participate. Particular care was
taken to practice informed consent consistent with the Common Rule subsection on
research involving prisoners (45 CFR 46, subpart C).
In addition to the involvement of the program population, moral judgment data
were gathered from full-time faculty of NOBTS. The data gathered from the faculty was
used in conjunction with program population data for the purpose of better addressing the
Research Question. Faculty data served as a benchmark for student moral development.
At the time this study began, a census of the 66 full-time faculty members was
planned, with the actual sample to be dictated by voluntary participation with informed
consent. Hurricane Katrina, however, caused the evacuation of the NOBTS main campus.
Most of the faculty who served in administrative roles (e.g., deans) relocated to continue
8

work in Atlanta, GA. The remaining faculty members were dispersed throughout the
country.
As a result of the faculty diaspora, a census of faculty was determined to be
impractical for this evaluation. Consequently, a sample was selected consisting of the 15
administrative faculty members in Atlanta and 15 randomly selected non-administrative
faculty members.
The inclusion of faculty was chosen for three primary reasons. First, the lack of a
control group limited the conclusions that may have be reached from this study. A
benchmark group was not the same as a control group but provided some external
measure. Second, Kohlberg found the moral reasoning of teachers directly impacted the
moral development of students (Bar-Yam, Kohlberg, & Naame, 1980). An evaluation of
faculty moral reasoning served to ascertain what level of moral reasoning was consistent
with the program’s intended outcomes. The third rationale for including faculty followed
from the second rationale. An evaluation of the moral reasoning of faculty, who
presumably represented the highest levels of moral reasoning in Baptist theology, served
as a tool for validating the DIT-2 for this study.

Instrumentation
The Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator®
(MBTI®) Form F instrument were administered to participants. The DIT-2 (Rest et al.,
1999) was an updated and shortened version of Rest’s (1979a) Defining Issues Test
(DIT), which was a written assessment based on Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview
9

(MJI) (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Liberman, 1983). The DIT had been used for more
than two decades, and researchers had accumulated results for more than 500,000
participants (Rest et al., 1999).
Form F of the MBTI instrument was the longer research version of the instrument
and consisted of 166 items. The Center for Applications of Psychological Type (CAPT),
producer of Form F, authorized that form for external researchers whose research was
related to concurrent CAPT research plans. This researcher contacted CAPT and was
approved to use Form F.
Both the DIT-2 and MBTI measurement tools were based upon extensively
evaluated theories and had been used for assessments within religious communities,
correctional systems and college programs (Good & Cartwright, 1998; Griffore &
Samuels, 1978; King & Mayhew, 2002; Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & Hammer, 2003;
Rest, 1986; Rest et al., 1999; Sandhu, 1997/1998; Watt, Frausin, Dixon & Nimmo, 2000;
Young, Cashwell & Woolington, 1998). The DIT-2 was considered especially valuable
for assessing moral development affect in professional educational programs (Rest et al.,
2000).

Reliability and Validity

DIT Reliability and Validity
The evidence for a cognitive theory of moral development was so strong Rest
(1986) believed, “if a person remains skeptical on the point that there are age trends in
10

moral judgment, it is doubtful that any finding in all of social science will be acceptable”
(p. 29, 32). One of the fundamental validity traits in Kohlberg’s theory was that
numerous studies had shown stage-progression is age-related. Similarly, early research of
the DIT supported its ability to measure moral development as a factor of cognitive
maturation. According to Rest (1986), “age/education accounts for 30 to 50 percent of the
variance in DIT scores” (p. 176). So, the general theory of a cognitive basis for moral
development was well supported.
Researchers had found the DIT was sufficiently reliable, with reliability
coefficients usually in the .70s and .80s (Rest et al., 2000). The original version of the
DIT had an internal reliability, using Chronbach’s alpha, of .76, while the shorter DIT-2
increased reliability to .81. Combing the DIT and DIT-2 increased reliability to .90, but
did not yield significantly different results The reliability and validity of the DIT and
DIT-2 were based upon hundreds of thousands of administrations. The DIT and the DIT2 correlated extremely well with each other (Rest et al., 1999).
The DIT and DIT-2 include several internal methods for protecting reliability and
validity. For example, DIT score reports include an M score, or Meaningless score.
A number of meaningless but complex-sounding items are interspersed
throughout the DIT. If too many of these items receive top ranking by a subject,
we infer that the subject is not attending to meaning, and consequently invalidate
that subject’s questionnaire. We also have an internal consistency check in the
DIT to determine if subjects are randomly responding without attending to any
item feature. (Rest, 1986, p. 197)
More than 400 studies have been used to validate the DIT in terms of cognitive
measurement, longitudinal consistency, age and educational discrimination, reliability
11

and other measures of professional ethics and social issues. Still, the developers of the
DIT sought to gather more data, especially data pertaining to demographic groups most
salient to the DIT construction and theory. More research was needed into moral
development in professional education and specific moral dilemmas could be devised to
measure the moral concerns within various professions (Rest et al., 1999). Because this
study concerns the professional preparation of clergy, this research provided valuable
contributions to the research literature.
According to Rest (1986), a large percentage of studies involving the DIT used
small sample sizes and have often involved no more than a couple dozen participants
(Rest, 1986). Literature reviewed for this dissertation included numerous studies with
small sample sizes. Many of the studies included fewer participants than the number of
participants who will be invited to participate in this research. Faqua (1983) investigated
moral judgment among 111 Christian college students. Ang (1989) studied 41 Bible
college students. Leeland (1990) studied 12 people in an experimental group and 13
people in a control group. Nelson (2004) used the DIT with a sample of just 56 Bible
college students. Blizard (1980) investigated differences in moral reasoning among
members of various denominations. Blizard’s entire sample was comprised of just 115
church members. Catoe (1992) investigated MBTI and DIT results among 92 college
students. Watt et al. (2000) included only 22 female prisoners as their primary
participants. Finally, another study in a prison population included just 30 participants
(Griffore & Samuels, 1978).

12

Some studies used negligibly larger sample sizes. Washington (1999) used the
DIT with 149 college students. Warren (1992) included 183 Christian college and high
school students, as well as 167 public school students. Hoagland (1984) used a sample
size of 154 in a study comparing conservative Christians with liberal Christians and
nonreligious participants. A study of Catholics who volunteered to teach religion
included 224 participants (Walters, 1980).
This study involved a population of 101 students. The size of the population was
appropriate for the DIT instrument and was expected to yield reliable and valid statistics.
Chapter 2 contains a literature review supporting the theoretical validity of the DIT-2 to
this particular evaluation.
The DIT has been used with Christian populations in numerous studies. Quite
often, Christian populations scored at approximately the national average. Many other
studies have shown Christians to score below average. Christian education programs,
however, have frequently intended to develop the critical thinking skills consistent with
the principled reasoning measured by the DIT-2. The DIT-2 was not a perfect measure of
Christian morality, as it was not designed for Christians, but the DIT-2 did meet the
validity requirements to serve in this dissertation. Further, the DIT was the most
appropriate measure available for this research.

MBTI Reliability and Validity
The MBTI was a time-tested instrument with high reliability and validity. Internal
reliability coefficients for middle-aged adults exceeded .90 for each of the 4 dichotomies.
13

Test-retest reliabilities were lower but still ranged from the low .60s to low .80s. The
psychological nature of the MBTI has caused the instrument to be susceptible to
variations based upon testing conditions. Further, the certainty of type preference
identifications has varied with each person and each dichotomy. The lack of certainty has
caused some individuals to provide different results in test-retest assessments (Myers et
al., 2003).
The validity of MBTI assessments has been evaluated by comparison with other
psychological measures. For example, the MBTI dichotomies have been correlated
modestly with corresponding dynamics of the 16 Personality Factors Questionnaire, the
California Psychological Inventory and the Strong Interest Inventory (Myers et al., 2003).
The MBTI instrument, like the DIT-2, has been theoretically based in an
assumption of universal applicability. Further, the MBTI instrument could not be used to
report negative results. No score on an MBTI report could be construed as a bad or poor
score. All personality type preferences were considered healthy aspects of human
personality.
Despite the presumption of all types being equal, there were researchers who
indicated type differences in moral reasoning. These findings actually supported the
validity of both the MBTI and the DIT. Type differences in moral reasoning largely fit
what investigators would have logically concluded based upon type and moral stage
descriptions.
The type differences in moral reasoning bore significance on the interpretation of
results from this study. Prior to the student assessments, the literature supported a
14

hypothesis that Introvert (I), Sensing (S), Feeling (F) and Judging (J) preferences would
be overrepresented among LSP Seminary students. The S, F and J preferences were
predictive of lower moral reasoning scores. The tendency of these types to predict lower
moral reasoning did not negate the use of the DIT for this population. Instead,
understanding these types allowed more valid type-appropriate interpretations of DIT
scores.

Data Collection
Students in the LSP Seminary program received letters inviting them to
participate in this study. The letters provided informed consent and requested their
signatures indicating whether they agreed or did not agree to be a participant. Those
students who agreed to participate were asked to complete the MBTI and DIT-2
instruments in a classroom setting at Angola.
Research involving prisoners was required to meet the requirements of Common
Rule subpart C. To ensure LSP Seminary students did not feel any undue pressure to
participate in this study, those students who attended received informed consent via letter
and verbally from the researcher just prior to assessment. LSP guards were not in the
classroom during the research process.
Each participant received an envelope containing the DIT-2 and the MBTI
instruments. Each envelope was marked with a particular participant’s name. The
instruments, however, were only marked with each student’s unique identification
number created by the researcher for this dissertation. Participants completed the
15

instruments, the DIT-2, the MBTI, and the envelopes were each returned separately to the
researcher. This method ensured the proper documents were provided to each student, but
the documents, once completed, could not be identified with the individual student by
anyone other than the researcher. Once the materials were returned to the researcher, no
other person at Angola was provided access to the materials.
The research involving the full-time faculty at the NOBTS main campus was
conducted in accordance with informed consent. The researcher originally proposed the
Director of Institutional Research at NOBTS would distribute the informed consent
letters, the DIT-2, and return envelopes to the faculty members at a regularly scheduled
faculty meeting. The research plan was changed, however, as a result of Hurricane
Katrina. The researcher delivered the materials to the offices of 15 NOBTS
administrators who held faculty ranks and were working in the temporary NOBTS office
in Atlanta, GA.
Because the New Orleans campus was closed for the fall 2005 semester and the
operation of the Seminary was temporarily relocated to Atlanta, the Atlanta offices
became the main campus. Those 15 faculty members constituted the entire full-time
faculty at the NOBTS main campus. To increase the number of participants and provide
data for faculty members not holding administrative roles, another 15 faculty members
were randomly selected from those dispersed throughout the country. In total, 30 NOBTS
faculty members were invited to participate. The faculty members were requested to
complete the DIT-2 and return the instruments by mail to the researcher.
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Data Analysis
For Research Question 1a, as to the existence of statistically significant
differences in the moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level LSP
Seminary students, data were analyzed using the DIT-2 P scores, stage scores and
demographic information. The Center for the Study of Ethical Development provided
DIT-2 results in an SPSS file. ANOVAs were used to investigate differences in
dependent variables, which were the respective DIT-2 scores, and the independent
variable, which was the taxonomy of class-year. Statistical significance was calculated
based upon a probability of Type I error of less than 5%.
For Research Question 1b, concerning statistically significant relationships
between the moral judgment and personality types of LSP Seminary students, data were
analyzed using the results from the DIT-2 and MBTI instruments. Moral judgment was
categorized by P scores. Personality type independent variables included each of the 8
individual dichotomy designations (i.e., I, E, S, N, T, F, J and P), the 16 personality types
(e.g., INTP), the 4 personality temperaments (i.e., SJ, SP, NT and NF) and Richardson’s
(1996) 4 spiritualities (i.e., NF, NT, SF and ST). ANOVAs were used to investigate
differences in the dependent variable, the P score, and the independent variables.
Statistical significance was calculated based upon a probability of Type I error of less
than 5%.
Data analysis for the single Primary Research Question, as to the extent to which
students in the NOBTS program at LSP develop moral judgment consistent with program
goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry, was evaluated
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with consideration of Research Questions 1a and 1b as well as faculty data. The analysis
was designed to enhance and expand upon the quantitative data from the preceding
Research Questions. The quantitative data found in the faculty DIT-2 results was
synthesized with the findings from previous questions, in an attempt to evaluate the moral
development of students in the LSP Seminary. The response to the Primary Research
Question, therefore, presents the primary purpose of this evaluation of a faith-based
program.
The research literature relevant to this program evaluation was limited in
significant areas of content. Little research was available concerning the moral
development of prisoners or the moral development of seminarians. While questions of
statistical significance could be determined quantitatively, program success had not been
defined quantitatively. Therefore, program success could not be fully understood
quantitatively.
An evaluation of the program’s effectiveness in facilitating moral development
necessitated consideration of initial moral judgment and the moral judgment of exiting
students, as well as the general progress shown across each year of schooling.
Additionally, an evaluation of the moral development of students included the subjective
assessment of growth respective of personality. Finally, a program evaluation
necessitated consideration of what moral judgment was reasonable and appropriate for
this population. The results of faculty evaluations facilitated creating a benchmark for
what moral judgments were consistent with the program goals and Baptist theology.
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Significance of the Study
There was considerable social and scholarly interest expressed in faith-based
initiatives, correctional rehabilitation and moral development. This study was intended to
contribute to a variety of highly salient issues. In particular, this study may serve to
assist: (a) the Louisiana State Penitentiary and the New Orleans Baptist Theological
Seminary to improve their program through empirical evaluation, (b) local and federal
legislators to make better policy decisions about faith-based, correctional and educational
programs and (c) educators to better understand the moral development of students.
A 2005 Congressional hearing was held to investigate the role of faith-based
initiatives in prison reform, and Angola’s program was a significant topic (“Confronting
recidivism,” 2005). The Seminary model had recently been expanded to the Mississippi
State Penitentiary at Parchman, MS. NOBTS had also been in discussion with the states
of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama, each of which had been considering creating seminary
programs in their prisons. Moody Bible Institute of Chicago had also been building on
the NOBTS model and was negotiating with the state of Illinois to begin a college
program in Illinois prisons (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005).
An investigation of this program had the potential to contribute tremendously to
social science and policy. According to Rest (1974), any program that could result in
even modest moral gains among the “extremely problematic” population of prison
inmates would be “spectacular” (p. 250). Unfortunately, moral development research
involving prisoners was quite rare.
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The need for research-based evidence for education’s impact on prisoner
development provided reason to investigate the effect education has on Angola inmates.
According to Everhart (1992), “education is credited with developing one’s ability to
think to become responsible for individual actions. This last concept is most meaningful
when dealing with criminal offenders. . . (p. 5).
The evaluation of this program was also important for the continuing political and
social discussion of social justice. Faith-based prison reform may be particularly
promising for the black community, which was dramatically overrepresented among the
prison population (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005).
Evidence of program success may be vital for the long-term growth and support
of prison education. The federal government cut funding for college education in prisons
because such funding was deemed a poor use of limited resources. The demonstration of
program success may be important to the government’s future support for faith-based
initiatives. Further, evidence of program success may be a step toward changing the
correctional culture that discourages wardens from pursuing reform.
The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance implemented the
Intensive Program Evaluation (IPE) Initiative to gather data on effective efforts to reform
the criminal justice system (U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997). The Department of
Justice expected to use research to help bureaucrats make better decisions about justice
reform. While IPE was specifically charged with gathering and disseminating data
regarding programs funded by federal grants, this program evaluation was relevant to the
IPE agenda.
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One impediment to prison reform had been the system of evaluating prison
wardens. According to Chaplain Toney, wardens were evaluated based upon the security
at their prisons rather than rehabilitation outcomes. A warden who prevented riots and
violence was considered a good warden regardless of the recidivism of released inmates.
Such a system encouraged wardens to adopt stringent control policies and discouraged
risk-taking, such as the creation of college programs. A college program relinquished
some control of prisoners to the college faculty. Additionally, allowing college faculty
and staff into the prison increased the risk of contraband being smuggled into the prison.
Under the evaluation system, one warden admitted recidivism was not a warden’s
concern. “If that prisoner walked out of prison 1 block and raped and murdered
somebody, that was still OK because they hadn’t done it on his watch” (“Confronting
recidivism,” 2005, p. 125).

Limitations of the Study
This study was limited in several important ways. The DIT-2 was designed to
assess only moral judgment, which was only one aspect of morality (Bebeau, Rest &
Narvaez, 1999). For example, the ability to make moral decisions does not necessarily
predict one will act according to such decisions. Further, as demonstrated in Chapter 2,
there was tremendous debate about what it meant to be moral. The DIT was based in one
particular theoretical system.
This study’s inclusion of the MBTI assessment was an attempt to understand the
affect personality may have had on moral development. Chapter 2 includes research
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demonstrating the findings from similar research. It should be noted, however, that many
other variables not accounted for in this study may have affected moral development.
Therefore, the results of this study, as all studies, are tentative.
This study was a one-time, cross-sectional study. More research, such as
longitudinal studies, would be beneficial in validating or refining the results of this study.
This evaluation was a beginning evaluation and should serve as an impetus for further
research.

Organization of the Study
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 consists of an
introduction to the study, including the background of the program, purpose of the study,
and research to be conducted. Chapter 2 details a review of literature pertinent to the
study. Literature related to moral judgment, education, personality types and theology
was reviewed. In Chapter 3, the methodology of this study is presented, including the
Research Questions and conducted statistical measures.
Chapter 4 presents the analysis of data and results for each of the Research
Questions. Chapter 5 consists of the conclusions reached based on the present research, a
synthesis of findings from previous research and this study, as well as delineation of
unanswered questions and suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND RELATED RESEARCH

What is Morality?
According to Rest (1986), “The function of morality is. . . optimizing mutual
benefit of people living together in groups” (p. 1). Rest borrowed from Rawls’s (1971)
statement, “It is morality’s special province…to provide guidelines for determining how
the benefits and burdens of cooperative living are to be distributed…” (as cited in Rest,
1986, pp. 1-2). Ethics, which was identified synonymously with morality, consisted of
two subcategories: meta-ethics and normative ethics. Meta-ethics consisted of the
philosophical study of ethics or asking questions about ethics. Normative ethics consisted
of the involvement in ethical conduct or developing policies and principles for ethics
(Singer, 1994).
Throughout history, philosophers have debated what constitutes the moral
decision, how morality may be evaluated, and how morality may be developed among
people. One of the foremost theories of moral development and measurement is that of
Kohlberg (1958). Kohlberg (1982) identified his theory as deontological (e.g., Kantian),
as opposed to teleological (e.g., utilitarian). A deontological ethical system evaluates
morality based on a presupposition that certain truths exist in the moral realm (e.g., lying
is wrong). A teleological system bases moral decisions on a presupposition that the
outcomes are the basis for judgment (Aron, 1977). Kohlberg (1973) traced the
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development of his own deontological justice orientation through the works of Kant and
Rawls.
Kohlberg was a developmental psychologist and formed his theory from the
scientific, developmental perspective. His system juxtaposed ethical decisions made on
the basis of rules with decisions based upon principles. According to Singer (1994),
ethics includes “values” and “rules” (p. 11). Values allow various choices that fall within
ethical boundaries. Rules are either obeyed or disobeyed. An example of a rule is to not
kill people. An example of a value is charity. Kohlberg (1981) defined the difference as
one of options.
To be honest [is a rule and] means ‘Don’t cheat, don’t steal, don’t lie….’ But
justice is not a rule…. It is a moral principle. By a moral principle, I mean a mode
of choosing that is universal…that we want all people to adopt in all situations….
There are exceptions to rules, but no exceptions to principles. (p. 39)
Psychology of Morality

Piaget
Piaget was one of the first moral philosophers to work from a scientific
perspective. In interviewing children about justice, Piaget (1965) found responses fit into
four categories: “Behavior that goes against commands received from the adult….
Behavior that goes against the rules of the game…. Behavior that goes against
equality…. Acts of injustice connected with adult society (economic or political
injustice)” (pp. 313-314).
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According to Piaget (1965), these four categories create stages of progression
from infancy through adolescence. The fourth stage moves beyond simple concepts of
equality of outcomes into the concepts of “equity.” “In the domain of distributive justice
it means no longer thinking of a law as identical for all but taking account of the personal
circumstances of each [individual]” (p. 317). “The motto ‘Do as you would be done by,’
thus comes to replace the conception of crude equality. The child sets forgiveness above
revenge, not out of weakness, but because ‘there is no end’ to revenge…” (p. 323).
Piaget’s (1965) groundbreaking work on the physical, social and psychological
development of children became a foundation for developmental theories, such as
Kohlberg’s. Piaget developed a theory that children progress linearly through four stages
of maturation. Moral development, in particular, was a progressive understanding of
justice. The first two stages occur in early childhood, until about the age of 7 or 8, at
which time stage 3 begins. Stage 4 begins in adolescence.

Kohlberg
Kohlberg (1966) used interviews of boys to further develop Piaget’s theory. In
Kohlberg’s theory, people progressed through three major steps, with each step including
two stages, for a total of six stages. He named the first step preconventional, or premoral.
The second step was the conventional stage. The final step was postconventional. Each
step involved a deeper and broader understanding of moral decision-making.
In various works, Kohlberg defined his theories through different contexts. For
example, Kohlberg (1973) once used the concept of personal rights to define each moral
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stage. In another work, Kohlberg’s (1981) moral theory was defined through the rationale
a person gives for respecting the human rights of other people. In small children, at stage
1, people had no value for the rights of others. Very young children understood that some
people were able to make claims on other people because of strength. The stronger
person could control the weaker person. Power defined all relationships.
As toddlers, people began to learn forms of manipulation. In stage 2, other people
were seen as objects to be used for personal gain. Toddlers did not necessarily understand
the personal needs and desires of parents. What the toddler understood was that certain
actions can cause the parents to behave in particular ways (Kohlberg, 1981).
Stage 3 began in middle childhood at a time when social relationships were
paramount. Human rights, therefore, became an issue of maintaining close social
relationships. Children did not want to hurt other people because such actions cause pain,
embarrassment and isolation. Most adults could be classified as either stage 3 or stage 4
(Kohlberg, 1981).
People in stage 4 have moved beyond merely thinking only of individual
relationships and have begun making moral decisions with consideration toward society,
as a whole. According to Kohlberg (1981), for the stage 4 thinker, “life is conceived as
sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties”
(pp. 19-20). Kohlberg’s stage 4 included moral decisions made through the confines of
any system of social order, whether government law, or religious law. The key to this
level was the subjection of individuals to the established order.
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Kohberg (1981) and Kohlberg and Ryncarz (1990), considered most Christians to
exist at stage 4, and in fact, considered Christianity to be a stage 4 system. To describe
human life as valuable because people are created in God’s image was stage 4 thinking
because the value relies on an external legitimacy. Even though such a view was
universal, the reliance on God’s decree made the philosophy a law and order philosophy
(Kohlberg, 1981).
The postconventional stages included stages 5 and 6. These stages were abstract
in nature, and most adults were not abstract moral thinkers. In stage 5, “life is valued both
in terms of its relation to community welfare and in terms of life being a universal human
right.” Stage 5 moral philosophies included social contract theories and utilitarianism. In
stage 6, “human life is sacred—a universal human value of respect for the individual”
(Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 19-20).
Stage 5 was abstract in its definition of universal human rights. Like stage 4, the
value of humanity was somewhat arbitrary. Laws were different from one country to
another. Therefore, stage 4 was based on an arbitrary value. Social contracts differ across
time and place, and utilitarian ethics differ with each situation. The universal aspect of
stage 5 rested in the determination that social contracts and utilitarianism were impartial
systems. Under a social contract, laws were applied to everyone equally (Locke,
2000/1690). In a utilitarian system, each person’s worth was no greater or less than any
other person’s worth (Mill, 2002/1861).
Kohlberg believed stage 6 was the highest level of moral development. In stage 6
thinking, “the worth of the individual human being is central where the principles of
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justice and love are normative for all human relationships…. Stage 6 people answer in
moral words such as duty and morally right and use them in a way implying universality,
ideals and impersonality” (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 22). In other words, stage 6 thinkers had
moved beyond the self-centered concerns of children, the social order focus of the
legalists, and the arbitrary decisions of social contract theorists and utilitarians. The stage
6 thinker had expanded the universal aspects of stage 5 from universal within current
society to universal across time and place. The stage 6 thinker was committed to
universal application of principles.
The scientific approach Kohlberg (1981) used to assess moral development was
based largely on Piaget. His work was not solely based in biological development,
however. He was significantly influenced by philosophical thinkers, such as Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Rawls, and Dewey. It was through such philosophy that Kohlberg
came to focus his research and his theory on the concept of justice. “I cannot define
moral virtue at the individual level, [so] I have tried it at the social level and found it to
be justice…” (p. 39).
Kohlberg’s (1958) theory was developed from interviews he conducted for his
doctoral dissertation. He eventually developed the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI),
which was a structured interview, conducted by trained interviewers (Colby et al., 1983).
Each participant was asked a series of moral dilemmas, such as the famous Heinz
dilemma. The Heinz dilemma asked what action a man should take when his wife is
dying of a curable disease, but the man cannot afford the medicine.
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The responses participants provided for moral dilemma questions were scored by
comparing them to the types of responses characteristic of each moral stage. The MJI
required significant time by researchers. Each interview lasted approximately 45 minutes.
Additional time was required for interpretation (Colby et al., 1983; Kohlberg, 1981).
The Defining Issues Test was development by Rest (1979a) as an adequate
substitute for the MJI because the resource requirements of the MJI were so significant.
While the DIT was initially intended to be an adequate substitute for the MJI, Rest and
his colleagues refined the DIT and its theoretical basis to the point where they deemed
the DIT to be superior the MJI (Bebeau & Thoma., 1999 May; Narvaez, Bebeau, Thoma,
& Rest, 1999; Rest et al., 2000; Rest et al., 1999).

Philosophy of Morality

Kant
Many moral philosophers would divide the world into the time before Kant, and
the time since Kant (Ferre, 1951). Kant’s system of ethics (1994b) was a major work of
the Rationalist era. He based his work on presuppositions of human rationality,
impartiality and goodness. The philosophy that dominated Western liberalism before
Kant was natural law theory. Kant differed from the natural law theorists in that he
believed in an innate goodness of people, which allows people to independently pursue
and reach the truth (Schneewind, 1992).
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Kant’s view of society was influenced by Rousseau’s (1988/1762) social contract
theory, in which independent people willingly surrender some freedom to enter into a
society that promotes justice through unanimously agreed upon obligations (Schneewind,
1992). Kant further developed Rousseau’s theory by claiming the social contract would
be based on universal principles of justice, not the majority opinion.
“Categorical imperatives” were to form the basis for universal ethical laws,
according to Kant (1994b). Categorical imperatives were those obligations rational
people would want to be universally applied. “Act only according to that maxim by
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law,” Kant wrote
(p. 274). According to Kant, those who would consider suicide or living off welfare
should consider the ramification if everyone committed suicide or became social
parasites. Neither choice is ethical since it stands to reason universal application of such
choices would lead to society’s destruction.
Honesty was a moral obligation, according to Kant (1994b). If telling the truth
results in another person’s harm, the speaker has no fault, for he or she merely conveyed
the truth. Kant used the example of a murderer who asks for information concerning his
victim. Providing information does not necessarily involve the speaker in the crime. A
speaker who lies, however, bears criminal culpability for any resulting harm, even if the
lie was told with sincere intentions of protecting the victim. “To be truthful (honest) in all
declaration, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited
by no expediency” (Kant, 1994a, p. 281). Kohlberg’s (1981) claim there are “no
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exceptions to principles” was an echo of Kant’s statement the principle of truth is
“limited by no expediency.”
A “practical imperative,” in addition to the categorical imperative, was argued for
by Kant (1994b). “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that
of another, always as an end and never as a means only” (p. 279). This view was similar
to the Golden Rule (Kohlberg, 1982). The moral foundation for both Kant and Kohlberg
was a principled belief that humans have innate worth.
In Kantian ethics, moral action is inspired by one’s own rational morality, without
regard to external rewards or punishments (Schneewind, 1992). According to Kant
(1994b), any act motivated by hope of a reward fails to be moral because of its selfish
motive. Ferre (1951), however, contends Kant, and numerous subsequent ethicists, have
defined morality and justice too narrowly. While narrow definition of a field is required
for modern academic scholarship, the practical effect is that ethicists have ignored the
contributions of the other fields offering insight into their work. Kant’s views on reward,
for example, have no place for many insights of behavioral and social psychology.
Kant considered religious faith to be important to moral development, but he
conceived of religion in a transcendental and agnostic fashion. Kant insisted he, himself,
was religious and that religion was indispensable to society. His religion, however, was
similar to his politics. Both religion and politics, in Kant’s mind, were constructs
intended to foster individual development. Because development could only come
through reason, both institutions were to be ultimately focused on reason (Wood, 1992).
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The philosophy of Kant was based in human rationalism and personal autonomy.
Kant viewed acceptance of the divine will to be “heteronomy,” not autonomy
(Schneewind, 1992, p. 316). Heteronomy was an individual’s subjection of his or her
own reason to externally created judgments. Autonomy was to use one’s own reason for
making judgments.
An individual’s obligation to others is a central feature of Kant’s philosophy.
Kant viewed charity as, at best, a necessary evil. He thought anyone who depended on
charity was a slave to the good will of the charitable giver. For this reason, Kant viewed
the concept of obligation as superior to charity. Only when one could demand specific
action from others could one be free from the whims of others (Schneewind, 1992). This
view is in significant contrast to the Christian theology of charity as a social good.
Mutual obligation, in which one person may demand something from another, is not a
significant feature of Christian theology. One may feel obligation to provide care to
another, but not necessarily to demand care be given by another person for one’s self.
As Singer (1994) noted:
Kant’s assertion that the moral law is a law of reason was based on his own
peculiar metaphysics. He saw human nature as eternally divided. On one side is
our natural or physical self, trapped in the world of desires. On the other is our
intellectual or spiritual self, which partakes of the world of reason from which the
moral law derives. (p. 8)
Rawls
Kohlberg (1973) argued Rawls’s theory of justice was more articulate and
developed than even that of Kant, and was quite superior to social contract theories.
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Rawls (1957) was concerned with justice in institutions and not justice as individual
moral action. That macro focus was similar to Kohlberg’s assertion that he could not
define individual moral action, but concluded justice is the hallmark of the moral system.
The theory of justice proposed by Rawls (1957) began on the premise all citizens
were entitled to the maximum freedom that did not hinder the freedom of others, and any
limitations on freedom must have had a utilitarian effect of maximizing the common
good. Justice was defined in a legal sense. “Justice is the elimination of arbitrary
distinctions and the establishment…of a proper balance between competing claims (p.
653).
Individual freedom was viewed by Rawls (1971) as always the servant of the
social structure. Whereas a libertarian viewed a worker’s wages as the private contract
between worker and employer, Rawls viewed wages as a systematic tool of social
engineering. “An inequality [of pay] is allowed only if there is reason to believe that the
practice with the inequality will work to the advantage of every party” (p. 654).
As a 20th century liberal, Rawls (1957) viewed equality and freedom in economic
terms. He assumed any group creating a society would be a collection of rent-seeking
factions, each trying to establish their own benefit. The result would be a moral,
socialized system, in which equality is artificially created.
Kohlberg (1973) specifically identified Rawls’s (1971) model of justice as the
epitome of moral reasoning. Kohlberg made the caveat, however, that Rawls’s social
model was not necessarily the only social model, because principles can be applied in
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different manners. Still, Kohlberg considered Rawls’s theory of justice to be the most
clearly and uniformly stage 6 moral system.
Rawls (1971) outlined one of the most significant rationales for modern liberal
political theory. Under his system, social systems were to be evaluated through concepts
of a veil of ignorance and a view from what he called the original position. His theory
asked evaluators to imagine being placed in the original position, which is a pre-mortal
state. Evaluators were given a certain amount of knowledge about societies; the
knowledge, however, was limited by the veil of ignorance. The evaluators were told
facts, such as the range of incomes within each society. The evaluators were not told,
however, the percentiles of income distributions.
From the limited vantage point of the original position, the evaluators were to
choose the society in which they would like to be born. The evaluators would not know
whether they would be born rich or poor, male or female, healthy or sick, etc. Rawls’s
presumption was that people will assume the vantage point of the lowliest people in
society, because they assume a significant chance exists they will be born in the worst
circumstances. Such evaluators would choose the society that offers the most justice (i.e.,
security) for the meek. In other words, a socialized nation would be preferable to a more
merit-oriented society.
Kohlberg (1973) believed a great quality of Rawls’s original position/veil of
ignorance was its applicability to both macro and micro-morality. He believed the system
could be used to solve personal problems such as real life dilemmas as well as social
issues such as social construction. One could use the system to decide whether to
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personally give to charity, and whether to vote for universal healthcare, by asking the
same question. The question to ask was what decision would make one more likely to
choose that society from the vantage point of the original position.
A common criticism of Rawls’s theory was the requirement that certain
knowledge be available, while other knowledge was denied, to the decision maker.
Kohlberg (1973) conceded the veil of ignorance required ignorance of certain
probabilities, while requiring knowledge of other probabilities. He considered the ignored
probabilities to be “morally irrelevant,” however (p. 644). In fact, Kohlberg (1973)
contended the selectively available information actually precludes non-moral issues, such
as self-interest, from entering into the decision. It is the intentionally limited information,
Kohlberg (1973) believed, that forced the issue to be entirely based on moral judgment.

Kohlberg
Justice was the epitome of moral reasoning, according to Kohlberg (1981). His
early work was based largely on the philosophical work of Kant and Rawls (Kohlberg &
Power, 1981). Kohlberg (1981) noted empirical studies were unable to identify stage 6
thinkers. Kohlberg’s progressive model of stages 1 through 5 was developed by analysis
of interviews. His stage 6 conception, however, was a theoretical derivative of liberal
philosophy.
The development of justice reasoning was vital to the creation of a morally
sufficient humanity, Kohlberg (1981) contended. Conventional reasoning was what led so
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many Nazis to engage in horrendous acts. The Nazi excuse of following orders is a stage
4 rationale, which appeals to law (Kohlberg, 1966).
Religion was placed in stage 4 by Kohlberg (1966). His example of stage 4
religious rationalizing was an interviewee who said, “The doctor wouldn’t have the right
to take life, no human has the right. He can’t create life, he shouldn’t destroy it.” Yet,
Kohlberg also allowed a transcendent religiosity in stage 6.
By the law of society [the husband] was wrong but by the law of nature or of God
the druggist was wrong and the husband was justified. Human life is above
financial gain. Regardless of who was dying, if it was a total stranger, man has a
duty to save him from dying. (p. 9)
So, while Kohlberg generally placed any appeal to religious law as stage 4 reasoning,
such appeals could be stage 6 if they appealed to universal principles. To say, “God
requires” was stage 4. To say, “justice requires” was stage 6. “Thus saith the Lord” was
stage 4, while “Thus saith wisdom” was stage 6. Kohlberg’s interview format hinged on
such semantics.
Stage 6 thinking was “to learn to make decisions of principle; it is to learn to use
‘ought’ sentences verified by reference to a standard or set of principles which we have
by our own decision accepted and made our own” (Kohlberg, 1966 p. 22).

Principled Reasoning
Kohlberg (1973), in part, validated his theory by noting that every philosopher
interviewed in his research reasoned at either stage 5 or stage 6, which are known as the
post-conventional, or principled stages. He contended stage 6 is more developed, but he
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did not adequately explain why many philosophers, educated in Kantian ethics, still chose
stage 5. Aron (1977) noted that many of the most significant philosophies (e.g., social
contract theory and utilitarianism) are more linked to stage 5 thinking than stage 6
thinking. Baier (1973), likewise, believed Kohlberg had failed to adequately differentiate
stages 5 and 6. Kohlberg (1982) admitted, himself, to significant difficulty in definitively
differentiating stages 5 and 6.
The concept of reversibility came to be the keystone of stage 6 thinking
(Kohlberg, 1973). Reversibility exists when an actor would make the same decision if he
or she were in the original position, a state in which the actor knows he or she will be in
the situation, but not at which social post. For example, in Kohlberg’s Heinz dilemma
(Colby et al., 1983), an actor in the original position would know he or she would end up
being Heinz, the wife or the druggist, but not know in which position he or she would be
placed. In such an original state, under the veil of ignorance, the moral decision would be
made because the actor would choose the decision best for the least benefited member of
the group. Reversibility is the foundation of Rawlsian justice (1971) because in Rawls’s
system, a just outcome is that in which any member of society could be placed in the least
benefited position and not feel mistreated.
Reversibility is seen as differentiating stage 6 from stage 5 because Kohlberg
concluded many stage 5 theories (e.g., social contract) do not meet the standards of
reversibility. For example, Adam Smith’s (2003/1776) capitalism postulates universal
principles of property rights. Smith believed property rights are universal principles and
not based upon an arbitrary social contract. Smith’s philosophy fails the stage 6 test of
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reversibility, however. From an original position, many people would not choose a
system that places them at the mercy of their own productivity. The 20th century move
toward socialism was evidence of the irreversibility of capitalism. Again, Kohlberg
(1981) and Rawls (1971) treated economic justice (i.e., security) as a keystone of sociomoral principles.
In stages 5 and 6, rights are common to all people, at least within the society, and
each member of society is expected to defend the rights of all others. A difference
between stages 5 and 6, however, is that in stage 5, rights are usually only those
acknowledged by the social contract, while in stage 6, rights are universal and impose
demands regardless of social acknowledgment (Kohlberg, 1973).

Kohlberg and Religion
According to Kohlberg (1982), the Christian concept of “Love your neighbor”
was just as legalistic as “Do not kill” and “Do not steal.” He classified all three biblical
standards as moral rules. In contrast, Kohlberg stated the biblical standard of “the golden
rule” was as principled as Kantian and Rawlsian ethics. In Kohlberg’s view, the
distinction was that rules prescribed “actions,” whereas principles provided “a method for
making a choice” (p. 520).
Like Kant, Kohlberg (1981) treated religion as a social construct, which required
the presupposition that religion was not true. Religion, then, was an arbitrary force of
social formation; religion was an aspect of culture, like dress, language, and cuisine. This
view led Kohlberg to the unavoidable claim that religion was independent of moral
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development. He frequently referred to literature supporting his claim. In his later work,
however, he came to include religion as a feature of moral development; still, he never
came to view religion as more than supportive of morality (Kohlberg & Power, 1981). In
fact, Kohlberg (1981) explicitly claimed religious education was almost worthless for
moral development.

Alternative Views
The moral development model of Kohlberg was frequently criticized from a
variety of perspectives. Some researches, such as Gilligan (1993), contested the
interpretation of Kohlberg’s research. Other writers, such as Bennett (1995), contested
the philosophical bases for his theory.
Flanagan and Jackson (1987) criticized Kohlberg’s theory as being too narrowly
focused on the singular concept of justice. Some scholars (Miller & Bersoff, 1992;
Snarey, 1985) criticized Kohlberg’s theory as being exclusive to liberal, Western
concepts of individuality and justice. Joy (1986) criticized Kohlberg’s notion of justice as
too narrowly defined. While Kohlberg claimed to base his research in Piaget’s concept of
moral justice, Joy believed Piaget’s justice was broader and more aligned with JudeoChristian justice. Kohlberg was led, according to Joy, by “his own political biases…into
obvious distortion of ‘what is moral’” (p. 406).
Moral development was viewed by Hogan (1973) as a combination of social
relationships and personal autonomy. During the course of his career, Kohlberg slowly
evolved to allow more influence from culture and society. His early work was so based in
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Kantian ethics that any reference to a social norm was considered conventional thinking
(Kohlberg, 1967). His later work still emphasized individual autonomy, but began to
allow that some moral principles could be influenced, or at least encouraged, by social
morals (Kohlberg & Powers, 1981).
Kohlberg’s inconsistency across time was a criticism of Reed (1997). According
to Reed, Kohlberg’s theory was based on a rationalist concept of self-created ethics.
Kohlberg’s Just Community pedagogy, however, relied on socially and democratically
created ethics, as well as social norms and pressures to encourage adherence to principled
morality.
The community, according to Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Powers, 1981), was an agent
for supporting or inhibiting moral principles, rather than teaching moral principles. It was
the supportive function, rather than instructive function, of the community Kohlberg
(1981) insisted prevented moral judgment from being externally oriented. For many
scholars, such as Reed (1997), the distinction was a semantic argument with little
practical significance.
One of the most influential critics of Kohlberg was Gilligan. She argued
Kohlberg’s justice ethic was too narrowly focused and biased against care, which she
contended, was the dominant ethic for women (1993/1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988).
Rest (1986), however, claimed Gilligan’s work was unsupported by the vast majority of
research. According to Rest:
[Gilligan] did not actually do a systematic review of the moral judgment literature
on sex differences before making the bold statement that justice-oriented scoring
systems downgrade women…. Systematic reviews are now available….and the
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results are unambiguous: it is a myth that males score higher on Kohlberg’s test
than females (p. 112)
Researchers using the DIT have also failed to replicate Gilligan’s claim (Aronovitz,
1984; Denny, 1988; Taylor, 1992; Wahrman, 1980; Watt et al., 2000; Wright, 2001;).
The evidence for the gender neutrality and other aspects of validity of the Kohlberg
model is evaluated later in this chapter.
Gilligan proposed care and justice orientations were not overarching moral
frameworks. Rest (1986), however, asserted Gilligan’s modified theory lacked support.
“Although the care orientation is said to be an alternative and parallel path of moral
development, there is not one longitudinal study or any cross-sectional data to support
that claim” (p. 117).
Despite growing evidence against Gilligan’s work, she was influential in the field
of moral development theory. Kohlberg (1982) admitted Gilligan’s work was a useful
hypothesis, especially in its early phases, and helped him refine his own interpretations of
interviews. In the long-term, however, Gilligan’s work was not validated.
In general, researchers found no gender differences on Kohlberg’s moral
dilemmas. Women, however, were more likely to use care orientations when responding
to a dilemma concerning surrogate parents. The emphasis on care among women was
even greater among women in prison (Watt et al., 2000). This might have been an
indication the care orientation was a lesser rationale and surfaced more when dilemmas
elicited affective bias.
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A pragmatic criticism of Kohlberg’s stage 6 was offered by Henson (1973). The
Kantian assertion that obligation is greater than charity is an integral part of stage 6.
Hogan believed the moral claims of stage 6 reasoning were ill-defined because Kohlberg
did not establish how one could determine which claims of a person were justifiably
binding on others and which claims were ignorable self-interests.
Kohlberg’s theory was criticized by Clouse (1985) who argued the conventional
reasoning of stage 4 thinkers could actually be a healthy for society in balancing the
change orientation and social upheaval of liberals. Clouse’s work specifically addressed
the Kohlberg’s (1966) frequent assertion conservatives, whether religious or political,
were less moral than liberals and posed the danger of Nazism.
Much of the debate concerning moral reasoning was a matter of defining what it
meant to be moral and what caused or inhibited moral development. Early Greek
philosophers, such as Aristotle and Socrates, disagreed with each other; Kant disagreed
with the natural law theorists. There was no consensus in moral philosophy and the
historical development of moral philosophy was rich and contentious.

Fowler
Fowler worked in conjunction with Kohlberg, but he conducted his research with
a focus on the development of religious faith. Fowler believed faith was a prerequisite for
stage 6 thinking because people needed some source for idealizing. According to Fowler,
Kant and Kohlberg appealed to faith in their own abilities, whereas Christians appealed to
faith in their theology (Wallwork, 1980). Wallwork, however, did not like Fowler’s broad
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definition of faith because it allowed for almost any belief not based in objective science
to be faith.
Fowler modified Kohlberg’s theory, based on the insistence morality and religion
were incongruent, to combine religious faith development and moral development into
parallel constructs (Wallwork, 1980). Fowler defined principled faith as deriving
authority from “reflective” thought (Kohlberg & Power, 1981, p. 334).
Kohlberg generally viewed Christianity to be a blind, obedient faith. Hoge et al.
(1982), however, claimed Baptists emphasize reflective thinking about their theology.
Baptist theology, then, is consistent with the development of mature faith, and hence
mature moral judgment. Grimley (1991) argued Kohlberg’s stage 6 is contingent upon a
developed religious belief. Further, Grimley found a relatively strong correlation of 0.75
between stage development in the DIT and Fowler’s stages of faith development.

Other Research Instruments
Although this literature review focused on the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a
review of other measurement instruments was conducted. There were numerous
instruments available. The DIT was the most common, however, and was determined to
be most appropriate for this research.
The Moral Justification Scale (MJS) was a paper and pencil test structured
similarly to the DIT. The MJS, however, was designed to categorize participants
according to justice or care moral orientations (Gump, Baker & Roll, 2000). As discussed
earlier, the care framework was useful as a supplemental consideration, but was not
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supported as an overarching theory. As an instrument, the MJS has a mediocre reliability
of .64 on the justice orientation and .75 on the care orientation (Gump et al., 2000).
Reliability of the MJS was considerably lower than the DIT (Rest et al., 2000).
An excellent collection of instruments, and analyses of their uses, reliability and
validity, may be found in Hill and Hood’s Measures of religiosity (1999). Their
collection included instruments for a variety of religious issues, such as faith, morality,
commitment, and fundamentalism. Most instruments, particularly those of moral
reasoning, have low reliability, in comparison to the DIT, and were not determined to
have validity for this study.

Defining Issues Test

About the Defining Issues Test
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was created by Rest as a substitute for the Moral
Judgment Interview (MJI). The DIT was a written test presenting six moral dilemmas.
Participants read each dilemma and then read twelve rationales for how to respond to the
dilemma. The participant was asked to evaluate the relevance of each rationale and
choose which rationales were most relevant. The various rationales were designed to
represent varying stages of moral judgment. The DIT had several inherent and obvious
advantages over the MJI. The advantages include the ability to evaluate more
participants, increased reliability across evaluations, and reduced costs (Rest et al., 1999).
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The test was a paper-and-pencil test, which meant it could be administered to
groups of people at one time. The MJI, on the other hand, required individual interviews
with each participant. The administration of the DIT allows the evaluation of much larger
samples (Rest et al., 1999).
The MJI required interviewers to be trained for the structured interview.
Additionally, significant training was required for the evaluation and scoring of interview
data. Every response given by a participant required evaluation for its fit with the moral
stages. While the structure of the MJI allowed reasonable inter-rater reliability, the
evaluations were still subject to human error. The DIT, on the other hand, was objectively
scored. DITs could be scored via a scoring rubric or computer scored by the Center for
the Study of Ethical Development, publisher of the DIT (Rest et al., 1999).
Substantial cost benefits were available to researchers using the DIT compared
with those researchers using the MJI. The ability to administer to larger samples, and do
so quickly, as well as score the results quickly, saved time and money. Evaluations of
large programs could be conducted with much greater efficiency using the DIT (Rest et
al., 1999).
After more than two decades in use, the DIT was recently revised. The new
instrument was known as the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2). The new instrument was
shortened to include only five dilemmas. Dilemmas were updated as needed.
Additionally, a new statistic was created for the DIT-2 (Rest et al., 1999).
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Four-Component Model
The theoretical basis for the DIT involved the Four-Component Model (Narvaez
et al., 1999; Rest et al., 2000). The Four-Component Model divided morality into four
categories: moral attention, moral judgment, moral motivation and moral virtue. Moral
attention was the ability to recognize moral situations. A sociopath, for example, lacks
moral attention. Moral judgment was the ability to choose the moral action that should be
taken by an actor. Moral motivation was the internal desire to act according to moral
standards. Finally, moral virtue was the personal determination to act morally, even when
it would be most convenient to act immorally.
The DIT was designed to measure moral judgment, the second of the four
components. Moral judgment requires moral attention, the first component. When
someone is faced with a moral dilemma, such as provided in the MJI or the DIT, that
person must recognize the moral features of the dilemma in order to provide a moral
judgment. The DIT’s focus on component two meant its results do not fully indicate a
person’s morality. For example, the DIT was not intended to predict what a person would
do in a situation. The DIT merely measured what a person thought should be done in that
situation (Rest, 1986). The DIT’s construction was aligned with Kohlberg’s view that
moral judgment is a matter of what one ‘ought’ to do in the situation.

Rest and Moral Theory
Rest substantially refined Kohlberg’s moral development theory, creating what he
called the neo-Kohlbergian model. One change in the neo-Kohlbergian model was
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Kohlberg’s stages were refined into schemas. Specifically, Kohlberg’s stage model was
based on the insistence that every individual exists in a particular stage. Evolution from
one stage to another was a punctuated action in which a person clearly changed from the
lower stage to the higher stage. Like Kohlberg’s stages, Rest’s schemas followed the
progressive, developmental pattern, and were also based on developmental psychology.
Rest’s schemas, however, allowed a more gradual transition across the range of moral
development. In the newer model, the schemas were as follows: (a) Personal Interest
(labeled S23), which correlates to Kohlberg’s stages 2 and 3; (b) Maintaining Norms
(S4), which correlates to stage 4; and (c) Postconventional (S56), which correlated to
stages 5 and 6 (Narvaez et al., 1999; Rest, 1986).
The Four-Component Model was created by Rest (1986) to describe the process
of moral action. The model consists of (a) rational decision-making, (b) moral evaluation,
(c) moral choice, and (d) moral fortitude. According to Rest, this model was based upon
“processes” and not “virtues” or personal “traits” (p. 5). Additionally, the cognitive
process involved interplay of the components rather than stage procession.
The DIT is based on the premise that people at different points of development
interpret moral dilemmas differently, and have different intuitions about what is
right and fair in a situation…. These [intuitions] are not necessarily apparent to a
subject as articulative rule systems or verbalizable philosophies—rather, they may
work ‘behind the scenes’ and may seem to a subject as just commonsensical and
intuitively obvious. (Rest, 1986, p. 196)
The behind the scenes function of the moral schemas was considerably different
than Kohlberg’s theory. In the MJI, interviewees were only scored according to the level
they could clearly explain. It was not enough for an interviewee to say Heinz should do
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some action. The interviewee must also have explained why that action was the moral
choice. The expository requirement of the MJI required individuals to have a firmly
established moral system in their own minds. The DIT, however, asked respondents to
choose the most moral action. Respondents did not need to explain why that action was
moral (Narvaez et al., 1999).
Respondents often scored higher on the DIT than the MJI. According to Rest
(1986), the format of the instrument caused the difference in the scores. “Since subjects
usually find recognition tasks (like the DIT) easier than production tasks (like the
Kohlberg task), it is not too surprising that the DIT credits subjects with more advanced
thinking than does the Kohlberg test” (Rest, 1986, p. 197). The DIT, in this view, was
more valid in measuring moral judgment, because it was measuring cognition rather than
verbalization.
The basic philosophical foundation for Rest’s theory was very similar to
Kohlberg’s philosophy. According to Rest (1986), a concept of “fairness” was inherent in
the mental paradigms of individuals, although the definition of fairness was relative to the
individual’s level of cognitive moral development (p. 10). For example, in stage 2, Rest
(1986) described fairness as, “direct exchange of favor for favor” (p. 10). Stage 3 entailed
a fairness of “maintaining positive, long-term relationships…that I know I can count on
you and that you can count on me….” (p. 10). Fairness in stage 4 was defined in terms of
the solidarity of the greater society which relied on the general willingness of people to
submit to the law.
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Individuals automatically used their personal definition of fairness when making
moral choices. Rest (1986) used the Heinz dilemma to illustrate the interaction of
“fairness” in moral decision-making. According to Rest, someone at stage 4 would
consider the possibility of Heinz stealing in terms of what social consequences might
result from theft. A person at stage 4 might ask what would happen if everyone chose to
steal when they were in need. The stage 4 thinker might conclude that while Heinz’s wife
should not needlessly die, rampant theft could damage society.
One variation Rest (1986) made to Kohlberg’s theory was an allowance for
greater social construction of moral principles. While Kohlberg gradually incorporated
greater acceptance of social power, such as the Just Community pedagogy, his foundation
in Kant always made him leery of groupthink. Kohlberg had referenced the Nazis as an
example of the danger in following society.
Rest disagreed with Kohlberg’s comparison of law and order with Nazi
culpability. Rest believed the key to developmentally valuable social norms was a society
open to discussion and the free exchange of ideas. Rest wrote:
Morality that is relative to group deliberation is not tantamount to the mindless
moral relativism or moral skepticism that Kohlberg feared, nor does it pave the
way to Nazi atrocities. Common morality might be different for different
communities (and therefore relative), but the common morality is debated and
scrutinized by members of the community and reflects an equilibrium between the
ideals and the moral intrusions of the community. (Rest et al., 2000, p. 385)
Morally productive societies do not merely prescribe law, but debate law and evolve law.
The theoretical foundation of Rest’s theory and the DIT were validated by researchers
who have investigated correlations between P scores and corresponding social principles.
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If the DIT accurately measured one’s understanding of abstract human values, such as the
rights to life, free expression and liberty, then the DIT should correlate reasonably well
with instruments that specifically measure attitudes toward those issues.
Getz (1985) found participants with high levels of principled moral reasoning
were moral likely to score high on a measure of support for controversial human rights
issues, lending support for the idea that moral reasoning scores indicate a factor in one’s
social thought. Similarly, Blizard (1980) found a significant relationship between moral
reasoning (DIT) and one’s commitment to humanitarianism.

DIT and Colleges Students
The DIT has been used in thousands of studies involving college students.
According to Rest’s (1986) review of education program evaluation literature, “the
overall power of moral education programs taken together without regard to type of
program is statistically significant, but is, according to Cohen, in the small range” (p. 79).
In that analysis, Rest considered programs that were specifically aimed at moral
development and measured using the DIT. Consequently, his programs were all one
semester or less, usually much less, in length. Rest focused his review on such short
programs to provide a reasonable limit to his research.
The program being evaluated in this dissertation was an entire college curriculum.
Rest (1986) described four general types of educational programs evaluated for moral
judgment effect They are (a) “moral dilemma” discussions, (b) “personality
development,” (c) traditional academic programs not directly teaching moral judgment,
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and (d) “short-term” programs (p. 80). Rest (1986) found moral dilemma and personality
development programs analyzed using this method yielded small effect sizes, while
academic and short-term programs had no effect. Because Rest (1986) focused on
literature concerning targeted moral education programs, he limited his review of
literature regarding entire four-year college programs. There was a plethora of literature
available, however, on college evaluations using the DIT. Some of that research was
briefly addressed by Rest (1986).
Educational program literature was evaluated by Rest (1986) who found college
students generally showed small gains (average effect size of .28) from moral
development programs. In one study of a two year nursing program, students did not
show any advance in moral reasoning (Aronovitz, 1984). One excellent literature review
concerning the DIT and college education, overall, was conducted by Pascarella and
Terenzini (1991). They concluded college programs were substantially related to
increases in levels of moral reasoning. Overall, education accounted for approximately
half of the variance in moral judgment scores (Bebeau et al.; 1999; Pascarella &
Terenzini, 1991; Rest, 1986).

DIT and Christians
The program evaluated in this dissertation was a distinctively Christian college
program. The DIT has been used extensively for studies of Christian populations, in both
educational and noneducational contexts. While the DIT was generally accepted as a
valid instrument for moral evaluation in secular settings, there were some researchers
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who doubted its validity for Christian populations. In Chapter 3, the validity of the DIT
for this program is elaborated in detail. This section provides a general review of
literature concerning Christians.
Religion was irrelevant to moral development, according to Kohlberg (1981). In
fact, he claimed his theory was universally applicable to all populations. A number of
critics, however, questioned his claims. Rest (1986) analyzed 24 studies concerning
Christians and found Christians usually scored slightly below average, or at the average.
He concluded the literature generally supports the use of the DIT with Christian
populations.
The difficulty in reviewing literature concerning Christians is differentiating
research by definitions of Christianity. Some researchers categorized Christians by selfidentification. Some researchers categorized Christians through church membership or
religious activity. Other researchers categorized Christians through the use of measures of
religiosity.
Some researchers have not found religiosity to be a significant factor in moral
development. Wahrman (1981) studied college students of various religions and found
religion to be unrelated to moral judgment. Religion accounted for a mere 5% of the
variance of DIT P-scores in a study by Dickinson and Gabriel (1982). Similarly, Radich
(1982) studied religious youth and found no significant differences based upon religion
(as cited in Rest, 1986). In a primary study of the DIT2, Rest et al. (1999) investigated
200 participants, who were categorized into four groups. One group consisted of graduate
students and included 13 seminarians. Unfortunately, Rest et al. reported the seminarians’
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scores as part of a larger group of professional school students, so data particular to the
seminarians were unavailable for this literature review.
A particularly interesting study of Christians was conducted by Nelson (2004).
Nelson found that while biblical literacy was related to higher P scores, those moral
scores were still underreporting the moral thinking of Bible college students. The
students were frequently responding favorably to stage 4 and stage 6 reasoning, but were
rejecting stage 5. Nelson suggested studies among religious populations might be more
accurate if scores for individual stages were also considered.
Christians may be unwilling to adopt stage 5 reasoning, while they willingly
adopt stage 6, because the social construction of stage 5 ethics is inconsistent with
biblical views of human sinfulness (Nelson, 2004). The universal and cosmic nature of
stage 6 does not have the human-created proposition of stage 5.
In a longitudinal study over four years of college, Shaver (1984) found results
similar to those of Nelson. Bible college students significantly decreased their use of
reasoning at stages 2 and 3, while they increased their reasoning at stages 4 and 6. There
was no significant change in stage 5 reasoning. The Bible college students were more
likely to choose reasoning at stages 4 or 6 than liberal arts college students.
The social contract/utilitarian features of stage 5 inherently contain two factors
that may be incompatible with some Christians’ theology. First, stage 5 reasoning,
according to Kohlberg, understood morality as arbitrary and socially constructed. Second,
stage 5 reasoning supposed human commitment to the social structure was paramount.
Rousseau’s (1988/1762) advice that religion and government be tools of social cohesion
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exemplified such humanistic philosophy. Stage 6, on the other hand, presupposes preexistent and universal values. While Kohlberg did not contend stage 6 values were
theocentric, stage 6 at least allowed a theology of divine preexistence. Stage 5 thinking
was more theologically oriented toward the clock-maker theology, in which God exists
but exerts no influence.
Bible college students were found by Nelson (2004) to prefer stage 6 reasoning
over stage 5 reasoning. Nelson supported Richards’s (1991) earlier findings that
Christians frequently used stage 6 reasoning, but rejected the social contract aspects of
stage 5 reasoning. Because P scores were comprised of the combination of stage 5 and 6
responses, Christians P scores were below national norms. In Nelson’s study, the mean P
score among Bible college students were 35.17 (sd = 11.69). McNeel (1994) found Bible
college seniors had a mean P score of 37.96 (sd = 14.52) (cited in Nelson, 2004).
Because Christians may not have been fully evaluated by P scores alone, Nelson
(2004) recommended researchers give consideration to variations in the scores for each
stage of moral judgment. While P scores were the focus of most DIT research, the
statistical reports from the DIT also included the percentage of time a respondent
preferred a rationale from each moral stage. Investigating these preferences for each
individual stage allowed researchers to see particular stage preferences, such as stage 6
over stage 5, which were not included in P scores.
The hypothesis that Christians may have preferred to skip stage 5 also had
important ramifications for interpreting data of college-aged populations. It was during
college that most adults began to contemplate the abstract and philosophical bases for
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principled reasoning. If non-Christians easily adapted to stage 5, they would have
appeared to progress more quickly than Christians. Such a trend might have led
researchers to conclude Christianity was negatively related to principled reasoning. If it
was true, however, that Christians prefered stage 6 more frequently than non-Christians,
the long-term result may have been that Christians more frequently attained the highest
stage of moral reasoning. The long-term benefit may not have appeared in studies of
Christian college students, and may not have been noticed in studies utilizing only the
common P score.
Some researchers have studied moral judgment as an outcome of theology.
Childerston (1985) found students rated as fundamentalists were likely to score at stage 4,
while students who did not fit the fundamentalist category were likely to score at stage 6.
Copeland (1994) studied 242 Christian college students and found students with more
fundamentalist theology scored lower on moral reasoning, using the DIT, than Christians
who were not categorized as fundamentalists. There was a slightly negative correlation (r
= -.13) between scores on a measure of religious fundamentalism and principled
reasoning (Rest et al., 1999).
Fundamentalist theology was defined in the cited studies according to the
believer’s commitment to authority, tradition and/or literalism. Because Kohlberg and
Rest both asserted that moral judgment is an outcome of personal reflection and cognitive
dissonance, an inverse relationship between fundamentalism and moral judgment should
be expected from fundamentalism, thusly defined.
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Researchers have also investigated the religious motivation of individuals as an
affect on moral development. Blizard (1980) found a significant relationship between
moral reasoning and internal, as opposed to external, sources of religious authority.
Blizard also found a relationship between P scores among Christians and moral abstract
personal theology. In a study of 210 Christian college students, De Witt (1987) found
small but significant differences in moral reasoning based upon the subject’s level of
intrinsic religious motivation. Ang (1989) studied 41 Bible college students and found
intrinsic religious motivation was related to higher moral reasoning (DIT) more than
extrinsic motivation. Ang concluded Bible colleges should incorporate pedagogy that
would facilitate development of intrinsic religious motivation.
Ernsberger (1977) and Ernsberger and Manaster (1981) used the Religious
Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967) to factor intrinsic/extrinsic orientation into the
DIT scores. They found intrinsically-oriented (church institution-oriented) church
members were more likely to espouse moral reasoning of their church’s theology. This
could indicate personality interaction with the DIT. Similar studies, however, did not
result in similar observations (Brown & Annis, 1978; Waters, 1980). Ernsberger and
Manaster’s research has not been sufficiently validated. Findings relating intrinsic
religious motivation and authority were consistent with Fowler’s faith development
model (Wallwork, 1980). According to Fowler, an individual’s faith was deepened and
strengthened through thoughtful reflection on religious beliefs and a willingness to
investigate new religious ideas.
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Many researchers found no relationship between religious identification and
moral judgment. Warren (1992) did not find significant differences between students at
Christian schools and public school students. Bruggeman (1996) also found no
relationship between attending public or private religious high schools in outcomes of P
scores. Wahrman (1980) did not find a significant relationship between moral reasoning
and religiosity or amount of time one has been actively religious. No significant
differences in moral reasoning were found in the religiosity of two-year nursing students
(Aronovitz, 1984). Guldhammer (1982) found principled reasoning increased across
college, but the increase was unrelated to religious identification. Catholicism was found
to be unrelated to moral development among college students (Wahrman, 1981).
Researchers investigating religious beliefs also frequently found no relationship
between beliefs and moral judgment. Washington (1999) did not find any relationship
between religious beliefs and moral development or religious activities and moral
development among 149 college students. In a study of 392 freshmen at a Christian
college, Banks (1995) found no significant differences on DIT scores between those
classified as liberals and those classified as conservatives on religiosity measures. In a
convenience sample of students at a large secular university, Hansen (1995) did not find
any relationship between moral judgment and religiosity, regardless of the liberalism or
conservatism of the individual’s religious orientation. Wahrman (1981) found a weak
0.153 correlation between religious dogmatism and moral development.
Longitudinal studies were infrequent in the literature, but researchers using such
data often reported no relationships between religion and moral judgment. McNeel
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(1991) performed longitudinal and cross-sectional studies of students in a Christian
college and found students showed principled level maturation equivalent to national
norms. No statistically significant differences were reported among students at Christian
colleges and those students attending secular schools in a study combining crosssectional and longitudinal data (Buier, Butman, Burwell & VanWicklin, 1989).
Some researchers found negative relationships between religion and DIT scores.
Hoagland (1984) found conservative Christians used less principled reasoning than
liberals and nonreligious individuals, and conservative Christians were more likely to
operate at conventional stages. Faqua (1983) reported Christian college students scored
below national norms on the DIT. The lower scores were found both in science majors
and religion majors. Being a science or a religion major was not significantly related to
moral reasoning.
A difference between church members and nonmembers, with nonmembers
scoring higher on the DIT, was found by McGeorge (1976). Clouse (1991) and Stoop
(1979) found Christians generally scored at stage 4 (as cited in Rest, 1986). In another
study by Nelson (1998), Bible college students showed very slight progress in moral
development and remained in the conventional stages. Ernsberger and Manaster (1981)
found negative relationships between religiosity and moral judgment, even after
controlling for socio-economic factors (as cited in Rest).
Positive findings relating religion and moral judgment were reported by some
researchers. Positive studies involving students included Harris (1981), Friend (1991) and
Nelson (2004). Harris found biblical literacy and P scores were significantly related
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among high school students (cited in Rest, 1986). Friend found seminary students scored
higher on the DIT than liberal arts undergraduate students. Nelson found biblical literacy,
moral development, and academic development progressed together among Bible college
students, but moral development was more related to biblical literacy than academic
development.
As previously reported, Nelson (2004) found P scores may have underreported the
moral thinking of Christians. Another study supporting Nelson’s proposal was conducted
by Hsieh (2003). Hsieh asked first-year, senior and graduate students, as well as faculty,
to complete the DIT-2 twice. In one examination, they were asked to complete the
instrument according to their own thoughts. In another administration, participants were
asked to complete the instrument according to their understanding of liberal values. All
groups improved their moral reasoning scores when acting as liberals. Hsieh concluded
educated Christians may well have understood liberal values, although their religious
convictions led them to choose more conventional reasoning.
Good and Cartwright (1998) found Bible college students showed moral growth
during their freshmen year yet reverted to lower level thinking by their senior year. Good
and Cartwright concluded the senior students had learned to think at higher stages yet
chose to ignore that moral philosophy in favor of conforming to the expectations of their
religious community. Wilcox (1986) reported evidence that some people may
demonstrate lower moral reasoning because they fear being labeled as troublemakers or
socially deviant. The immature yet principled thinker may find it difficult to advocate a
principled life in a conventional world. Kuran (1997) has written about the common
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phenomenon of people misrepresenting their own beliefs in order to conform to social
norms.
Overall, the literature available concerning moral judgment of Christians was
quite contentious. In his detailed review of literature, Rest (1986) agreed with Kohlberg
and concluded religion was generally independent of moral judgment. Such a conclusion
was in contrast with the work of Fowler who directly tied the development of moral
judgment to the development of faith. Fowler’s definition of faith, however, was not faith
in the common religious sense (e.g., God’s providence) but rather faith in unproven ideas.
Previous research frequently suffered from significant flaws. Any research in
which religion was defined through self-identification or membership in an association,
such as a church or religious college, should be considered suspect (Lee, 1980). Just as
voter registration in a certain party does not provide significant information about a
voter’s ideology on most issues, religious identification is not the same as religious
conviction.
The self-identified ideology of individuals has been found to bear almost no
resemblance to the actual beliefs of those individuals (Converse, 1964). Further,
Converse argued the great majority of people are so lacking in critical, especially
abstract, thought, they cannot be said to truly hold any ideology. Personal development,
whether in terms of moral judgment, religious faith, or political involvement, is
contingent upon personal autonomy, thoughtful reflection, and discourse.
Autonomous, reflective, and active religious belief should result in more
developed moral judgment. The program evaluated in this dissertation was considered to
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involve those developmental prerequisites. The rationale for this consideration is
developed later in this chapter.

DIT and Prisoners
The shortcomings of Gilligan’s care framework have been partially addressed
earlier in this chapter. A study by Gilgun (1995), however, bore significance for this
dissertation. Gilgun investigated whether criminals displayed emphasis on care
(Gilligan’s theory) or justice (Kohlberg and Rest’s theories). While the study did not
involve the DIT, its results provided considerable support to the validity claims of the
DIT in terms of both stage theory and applicability to the current study’s population.
Gilgun (1995) interviewed prisoners convicted of incest to determine whether
such offenders held justice or care moral orientations. She hypothesized offenders would
be justice oriented, because she believed the masculine and impersonal qualities of justice
would be more amenable to incest than the compassionate and personal concepts of care.
She concluded, however, incest perpetrators unanimously favored care orientations.
Incest perpetrators could more easily justify their actions through a care orientation,
which was inherently subjective and fluid.
In the field of corrections, the DIT has been used in many ways. For example,
Horan and Kaplan (1983) used the DIT to understand the sentencing decisions of jurists.
There was little research, however, directly related to this current program evaluation.
Directly related work had been absent for some time because NOBTS was the only
undergraduate college operating within a prison at the time of this study.
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When the federal government cut financial aid for prisoner education, the
University of Great Falls was operating a prison college. The University conducted a
program evaluation in an attempt to justify state funding that would have continued the
program. Unfortunately, they found their program had virtually no impact on the moral
development of prisoners (Nelson, 1995). Spartanburg Methodist College also attempted
a program evaluation to justify its prison college in the face of federal budget cuts.
According to Everhart (1992), Spartanburg’s program provided some effect on the selfesteem of black prisoners, but showed little else in terms of successful education.
Prison populations were noted by Rest (1974) as being among the most difficult
to help. Rest referred to educating prisoners as “extremely problematic” (p. 250). In fact,
he noted an absence of literature to guide policy and specifically remarked on the need
for such research. He warned of the potential challenge of prison rehabilitation, but
suggested even modest gains in the moral reasoning of prisoners would be “spectacular”
(p. 250).
In moral development testing, prisoners generally attained P scores similar to
middle school students (Rest, 1979b). The mean score for prisoners was 23.5, and the
mean score for middle school students was 21.9. People at this level of reasoning tended
to be egocentric in their moral reasoning. These scores compared with means of 31.8 for
high school students, 40 for adults, 42.3 for college students, 59.8 for seminarians at
liberal Protestant schools, and 65.2 for academic philosophers. Prisoners generally reason
at stages 2 or 3, measured by Kohlberg’s model (Stevenson, Hall & Innes, 2003).
Considering that Angola was home to only violent and habitual offenders, it may be
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Angola inmates used moral reasoning no higher than the average for prisoners, and most
likely reasoned at lower levels.
One explanation for the low growth of prisoners may be found in the work of
Jessor and Jessor (1977). They investigated the thinking of delinquent youths and found
criminals were significantly more likely to exhibit external loci of control. External loci
of control are inconsistent with the autonomy said to be necessary for moral growth.
External loci of control may also make an individual less likely to engage in critical
reflection, since the results of reflection are not likely to be viewed as useful. In order for
the Seminary at LSP to be successful, it may need to facilitate self-empowerment of
inmates. Such self-empowerment can be difficult in a prison population where members
are unable to control virtually any aspect of their lives.

DIT and Pedagogy
The best method for moral education had been a topic of debate through much of
human history. Aristotle and Socrates lectured on moral development in ancient Greece.
Augustine and Erasmus proposed ideas of moral education in the ancient churches. Moral
education pedagogy, like moral philosophy, has changed across times and places.
Kohlberg’s general theory and advice on educational pedagogy evolved across his
career (Rest et al, 2000). According to Rest (1974), Kohlberg’s pedagogy was a blending
of Dewey’s philosophy and Piaget’s psychology. Kohlberg insisted any moral education
must be based in developmental theory. Moral education could not be virtue or habit
oriented but must have encouraged thoughtful analysis (Kohlberg, 1966). Like Kohlberg,
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Rest (1986) refuted Aristotle’s assertion that morality was a product of good parenting
and was firmly established by adulthood. According to Rest (1986), “adults show more
change than younger participants in moral education programs” (p. 177).
The possibility of moral growth in adulthood was essential for the success of
criminal rehabilitation efforts. The effort at LSP presupposed moral development was
more fluid and adaptable for adults than suggested by Aristotle. Aristotle (1994), in his
writings, displayed a concern for justice, but he believed morality was a factor of
pedagogy built upon pedigree. Educational theory, at least since Dewey, has been
significantly more democratic. Additionally, earlier Christian educators, such as Erasmus
and Raikes, believed the lowliest members of society were capable of full moral growth
(Reed & Prevost, 1993).
According to Kohlberg (1966), moral teaching should be targeted one stage above
the level of the learners. Such teaching was within the limits learners were able to
understand, while it still required the learners to stretch mentally as they sought to
understand the materials. This teaching method was unrealistic, however. A teacher could
not assess a learner’s response to categorize the stage and then develop an appropriate
response, all within the timeframe available in class (Rest, 1974).
The difficulty of individuals teaching according to developmental theory may
have been one reason Kohlberg developed a structural approach to moral education (BarYam et al., 1980). He advocated the Just Community model, which was based on the use
of social environments to foster moral growth. The Just Community model incorporated
democratic governance, even with small children. The democratic principles facilitated
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the dialogue necessary for exposure to new ideas, especially the controversial ideas
traditionally repressed in less open societies.
Just communities operated through a social contract system, which was based in
principled reasoning. An example Kohlberg provided for a Just Community was the
kibbutz movement, which expanded through Israel in the 1970s. Kohlberg believed the
religious socialism of the Jewish kibbutz was consistent with the democratic debate
necessary for moral development (Bar-Yam et al., 1980).
A kibbutz was a small, communal, egalitarian microcosm. Rules in a kibbutz were
socially created. Once rules were created, however, significant social pressure was placed
on individuals to maintain obligations under the social contract. This social pressure
sustaining kibbutz life seemed inconsistent with the philosophy of moral autonomy and
self-created moral principles Kohlberg formed from Kant. Kohlberg explained the
pressure was not inconsistent with his Kantian philosophy, however, because the pressure
existed to encourage more moral behavior (Bar-Yam et al., 1980).
The founding principle of a kibbutz was a commitment to the creation of social
justice. Therefore, the kibbutz social pressure was a pressure to be more just. Kohlberg
viewed this pressure as something to facilitate the principled reasoning of the individual,
who has presumably self-committed to justice. In other words, the kibbutz pressure was
opposite of the social pressure that motivated individuals to surrender principles to the
convention of society (Good & Cartwright, 1998; Kuran, 1997, Wilcox, 1986). In terms
of the neo-Kohlbergian model, the Just Community used social pressure to bridge the
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gaps between moral judgment (component 2), moral motivation (component 3) and moral
virtue (component 4).
Kohlberg viewed religious systems to be external orders, which were rooted in
stage 4 thinking (Kohlberg & Power, 1981). Orders, whether from a visiting angel, the
Ten Commandments, the Bible, or a priest, were rules and not principles. Consequently,
Kohlberg viewed religious education as being of little moral value. According to
Kohlberg (1966), religious education was almost never effective in advancing moral
thought. This reinforced Kohlberg’s definition of religion in terms of social systems (e.g,
churches and denominations) rather than in terms internal belief systems.
Researchers have often come to different conclusions about religion’s impact on
morality when they considered religion at the individual level. Ang (1989) reported
intrinsically motivated Christians exhibited higher moral reasoning than extrinsically
motivated individuals. Religion that was internalized and personally meaningful, then,
appeared to have benefits for moral judgment. Ang investigated students at a Bible
college who were presumably the more theologically conventional members of their
religious communities. Ang concluded religious education pedagogy targeted at
developing internal religious reflection led to greater moral development.
Rest (1986) supported the idea that one’s motivation toward education was a great
influence on moral development. He also supported the Kohlbergian combination of
individual reflection and social support for moral development.
Development proceeds most when the person seeks to develop and when the
situation fosters and supports development. Personal characteristics and
environmental characteristics mutually influence each other. (p. 52)
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The people who develop in moral judgment are those who love to learn, who seek
new challenges, who enjoy intellectually stimulating environments, who are
reflective, who make plans and set goals, who take risks, who see themselves in
the larger social contexts of history and institutions and broad cultural trends, who
take responsibility for themselves and their environs (p. 177)
In general, prison inmates have not normally been academically oriented. This
may be a primary reason why prison education programs tend to receive little interest
from prisoners (Everhart, 1992). Contrarily, the LSP program’s enrollment capacity was
not large enough to satisfy the amount of interest from inmates. It was unknown,
however, what actually motivated students to participate in the program. It was possible
students simply wanted to alleviate boredom as was reported by many participants in
Everhart’s study. It may also have been these seminarians genuinely wanted to work in
ministry. A vocational interest in ministry did not, however, necessarily demonstrate an
academic interest in theology.
The vocational and practical foci of the LSP Seminary may have had a positive
influence on moral development even apart from academic interest in theology. Deemer
(1987) found a relationship between vocational satisfaction and moral judgment.
According to Rest (1986), the Deemer coding method “gives more importance to the
subject’s own sense of identity and doing personally meaningful work than to financial
security” (p. 54). This could have benefited students in Angola, because they presumably
committed themselves to a religious vocation they believed would be meaningful and
would fulfill their ‘calling.’ Maslow (1987/1954) proposed vocation was important to
personal fulfillment and growth. If the LSP Seminary facilitated a student’s vocational
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development and personal fulfillment, the educational atmosphere may have been more
conducive to moral growth.
Another important finding from Deemer (1987) was his identification of “civic
responsibility” and “political awareness” as important factors relating to moral judgment
(as cited in Rest, 1986, pp. 54-55). The prison environment was noted earlier as being
overwhelmingly inconsistent with any sort of social activism. LSP’s warden, Burl Cain,
noted traditional corrections theory rejected any sort of empowerment for prisoners.
Many in the corrections field criticized the LSP Seminary precisely because it
empowered students (Frink, 2002).
Wright (2001) found community service was not related to increased moral
development among students at a Christian college. Wright investigated community
service requirements as part of a Christian college curriculum. Community service,
especially externally organized community service, was not the same as the civic
empowerment and activism investigated by Deemer (1987).
Education was related to moral development. According to Rest (1986), “One of
the strongest and most consistent correlates of development in moral judgment have been
years in formal education, even more so than chronological age per se” (p. 33). Rest
noted, however, that “short-term” moral education programs, lasting fewer than three
weeks, had not been shown to be effective. Moral education programs, such as found in
semester-long ethics courses, could be effective in producing small improvements in P
scores. Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) noted college, overall, was a substantial catalyst
for moral development.
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Despite research showing certain programs, and education in general, to be a
positive influences on moral development, the exact experiences that cause moral growth
were still unknown. Rest (1986) compared research attempts to discern which life
experiences foster moral growth to research attempts to discern which foods make people
obese. There was no clear answer because different people gained moral judgment from
different experiences just as different people gained weight from different foods.
Moral development appeared to be more gradual than punctuated. While general
activities, such as college attendance, were related to development, Rest (1986) could not
identify specific moments or moral issues that caused growth. An experiential example
provided by Rest was that the socio-moral issues of dodging the Selective Service draft
did not discernibly affect moral judgment. Rest (1974) did identify participative
education as one pedagogical technique with the potential for moral impact. Moral
development could be fostered by providing students with opportunities to involve
themselves in new “social roles,” such as “teacher, counselor, or caretaker.” The key to
such moral growth opportunities was to provide students with “real responsibility” (Rest,
1974, p. 255).
The LSP Seminary students were active in their religious communities and were
involved in the field where they felt called for their vocations. The program’s addition of
internships allowed the practice of pastoral responsibility among students. A pastor has
been biblically defined in Rest’s terms of being a “teacher, counselor, [and] caretaker.”
As students studying pastoral work, and actively involved in aspects of that work, the
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LSP students may have been exposed to the developmental catalysts infamously absent in
the corrections system.
Clinical Pastor Education (CPE) training significantly increased the moral
reasoning of seminary students who were below their group average at the beginning of
training (Leeland, 1990). No significant change was found in those students who began
the program at the average or higher than average levels of moral reasoning. It was
unknown whether the more advanced students had previously been exposed to the
learning experiences provided by CPE, and were therefore less affected by it, or whether
CPE was generally less effective for advanced moral thinkers. Regardless of the reason
advanced thinkers benefited less from pastoral experiences as part of their education,
Leeland’s findings were significant for the LSP population. If LSP students began their
education at the low levels of moral reasoning expected of prisoners, the practical
education of LSP should have been quite beneficial.

Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)

MBTI Construction
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, developed by Katherine Briggs and Isabel
Briggs Myers, was based upon Carl Jung’s psychological theory. Jung posited human
personalities could be classified according to the methods by which individuals
cognitively received new information, and the processes by which individuals processed
that information. For each consideration, there were two personality types. People
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received information either intuitively or through the senses. The person with a
preference for Intuition (N) preferred to receive information as concepts or systems. The
person with a preference for Sensing (S) preferred to receive information in practical or
concrete manners (Myers et al., 2003).
People processed information either through thinking or through feelings. The
person with a preference for Thinking (T) preferred to process information through
objective, rational analysis. The person with a preference for Feeling (F) preferred to
process information by evaluating the information in accordance with personal values
(Myers et al., 2003).
Briggs and Myers (Myers et al., 2003) further developed Jung’s theory to include
two more aspects of personality. They added considerations of how a person interacted
with the world, and how people acted upon their information processing. Briggs and
Myers proposed people were either Extroverts (E) or Introverts (I), and either Judging (J)
or Perceiving (P). Introverts preferred to focus their energy internally. Extroverts
preferred to focus their energy externally. People who preferred Judging worked to make
decisions with their information and to organize their environs. People who preferred
Perceiving were more inclined to leave evaluations of information flexible and adaptable.
Although each dichotomy (i.e., E/I, S/N, T/F, J/P) of the MBTI operated
independently of the others, the combinations formed the full MBTI personality “type.”
Someone with preferences for Extraversion, Intuition, Thinking, and Judging was not
merely an E, an N, a T, and a J. The person was an ENTJ. The interaction of each
independent dichotomy created a unique total personality. Thinking Extroverts did their
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thinking differently than Thinking Introverts. In total, there were 16 MBTI types (Myers
et al., 2003).
The MBTI instrument was a paper and pencil, multiple choice assessment
administered by practitioners qualified according to the guidelines of the MBTI
publisher, the Center for Applications of Psychological Type (CAPT). CAPT allowed
practitioners to be qualified through academic credentials, CAPT training, or university
supervision. The researcher conducting this study was qualified by CAPT through all
three criteria.
Item statements in the MBTI were similar in theoretical construction to those in
the DIT. The wordings were provided in a manner that elicited specific thoughts in
individual readers. At the same time, statements did not provide the details necessary for
readers to construct a new concept or discern the instrument’s intention. Like the DIT, the
MBTI had been used for decades, administered to multitudes of people, and utilized and
validated through thousands of studies (Myers et al., 2003).
An important feature of the MBTI was the theoretical assumption that all MBTI
personality types were inherently natural and healthy. Unlike many other psychological
measures, such as the Neo Personality Assessment, the MBTI could not be used to
classify anyone as ordinally higher or lower than anyone else. The MBTI was designed to
help individuals understand themselves and others, not to form a basis for diagnosing or
treating participants (Myers et al., 2003). Table 1 provides information on the distribution
of personality types in the American population.
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Table 1
Type of Percentage of US Population Demographic Groups
Type
ISTJ
ISFJ
INFJ
INTJ
ISTP
ISFP
INFP
INTP
ESTP
ESFP
ENFP
ENTP
ESTJ
ESFJ
ENFJ
ENTJ
E
I
S
N
T
F
P
J

US Total

Blacks

Males

12-16
10-13
2-3
3-4
5-7
5-7
4-5
5-6
5-7
6-9
6-8
4-7
10-12
10-12
3-5
3-5
50-55
45-50
65-70
30-35
45-55
45-55
40-45
55-60

15.0
12.7
1.4
1.9
5.8
10.0
2.5
3.6
6.1
9.7
8.9
1.4
8.9
8.6
1.1
2.5
47.1
52.9
76.8
23.2
42.7
57.3
47.9
52.1

16.4
8.1
1.2
3.3
8.5
7.6
4.1
4.8
5.6
6.9
6.4
4.0
11.2
7.5
1.6
2.7
45.9
54.1
71.7
28.3
56.5
43.5
48.0
52.0

Male College
Students
12.48
5.44
2.65
5.40
6.81
4.09
5.32
6.63
6.72
4.41
6.26
6.77
12.81
5.46
2.98
5.78
51.18
48.82
58.22
41.78
63.4
36.6
47.0
53.0

Note. Data collected from Myers et al., 2003.

MBTI and the DIT
Because the MBTI presupposed all personality types were inherently equal in
terms of psycho-social value, it would have been reasonable to think personality types
were unrelated to moral judgment. Research did not support that presupposition,
however. The philosophical foundations of Kohlberg were predisposed to certain
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personality types. The differences in moral reasoning related to personality type were not
a reason to discount either instrument, however. Instead, a theoretical synthesis of the
DIT and MBTI can actually help evaluators and educators. Evaluators may integrate the
MBTI instrument with moral evaluation to better understand research results. Educators
may use an understanding of the MBTI theory to create pedagogy that better addresses
the individual student.
The Kantian ethical system of evaluating individual actions through universalized
systems was Intuitive (N), rather than Sensing (S). The objective, formal Thinking (T)
preference was more aligned with the calculated rationalism of Kant than the personal
values orientation of the Feeling (F) preference. The reflective nature of Introversion (I)
was logically more related to Kantian ethics than the social orientation of Extraversion
(E). Finally, the tentativeness and openness of Perceiving (P) types was hypothetically
more inclined toward postconventional growth than the Judging (J) preference, which
was related to preferences for definition and closure. In theory, then, an INTP would have
been most amenable to moral development, and an ESFJ would have been least amenable
to moral development.
Advanced moral thinking was contingent upon the synthesis and systemization of
abstract principles and philosophies (Rest, 1974). Such higher order thinking was similar
to the descriptions of Thinking (T) and especially Intuition (N) in Myers-Briggs
typology. Feeling (F) oriented people sought decision-making through subjectively
evaluating the scenario, whereas Thinking (T) oriented people were more likely to seek
the incorporation of universal principles. Intuitive types looked for the whole system in
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operation, while Sensors sought the obvious answer to the present circumstances (Myers
et al., 2003).
According to Hirsh and Kise (2000), NTs were likely to create new systems for
application and SFs frequently worked to build community. Therefore, NTs were
naturally consistent with Kohlberg’s theory, while SFs were more naturally inclined
toward conventional reasoning. Hasler (1987) hypothesized the Introverted (I) personality
type would be related to higher moral reasoning, as measured by the Sociomoral
Reflection Objective Measure (SROM). Hasler, however, found the E/I scale was not
related to moral development, while the J/P scale was significant to moral development.
Those with Perceiving (P) preferences were likely to score higher on moral reasoning
than those with Judging (J) preferences. Hasler concluded the closure-seeking tendencies
of Js made them less likely to seek and internalize the new experiences necessary to
cause moral growth.
The relationship between personality type and moral reasoning was investigated
by O’Brien (2000). She found the perception (S/N) and judging (T/F) functions were both
significantly related to moral reasoning scores. Additionally, the perception and judging
functions combined to create a significant interaction effect for moral reasoning. The
Feeling (F) preference was significantly related to more frequent use of stage 3 reasoning
than the Thinking (T) preference. Intuition (N) judgment was related to more frequent
post-conventional moral reasoning than Sensing (S). Taylor (1992) also found Thinking
(T) was related to higher moral reasoning than Feeling (F). Contrary to most research,

75

McMahon (1992) found the Feeling (F) preference was related to higher moral reasoning.
Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences were related to stage 4 reasoning.
Redford (1993) hypothesized higher moral reasoning among people with
preferences for Extraversion (E), Intuition (N), Thinking (T) and/or Perceiving (P)
preferences. She found ISFJ and ISTJ were both underrepresented among participants
with above-average moral reasoning. Further findings included the Intuitive (N) and
Introverted Perceiving (IP) preferences were significantly related to above average moral
reasoning. Redford concluded the moral growth of ISJs was slowed because they were
more focused on the present and less willingly to entertain conflicting paradigms.
Unlike O’Brien (2000), Redford (1993) did not find significant moral reasoning
differences between participants with Thinking (T) and Feeling (F) preferences.
Redford’s research built upon the findings of Catoe (1992) and Denny (1988). Catoe
(1992) found Intuition (N) was related to higher moral reasoning than Sensing (S) and
Denny (1988) found no difference in moral reasoning based upon the Thinking (T) or
Feeling (F) preferences of the participants. Denny (1988) did not use the DIT or MJI but
chose the Social Reflection Questionnaire (SRM). The difference in method may account
for not finding a relationship between MBTI preference and moral reasoning.
Gilligan’s theory of women using a care orientation, as opposed to male justice,
had not been validated by subsequent research. Gender differences in personality type
might be used to partially explain some moral orientations. Women were moderately
more likely to prefer Feeling (F), and men were moderately more likely to prefer
Thinking (T) (Myers et al., 2003).
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A relationship between Feeling and care is not necessarily supportive of
Gilligan’s theory. Neither is it contrary to Kohlberg’s claims of a universal moral theory.
Additionally, the MBTI preferences were not absolute descriptions of human thought and
action. A preference simply implied the most natural behavior for an individual. In fact, a
fundamental part of MBTI theory was that all people used all preference types at some
time. An Introvert was not absolutely disinterested in socializing. A person who preferred
Feeling (e.g., values) was not absolutely disinterested in objectivity. Therefore, a person
with a preference for Extraversion, Sensing, Feeling and/or Judging was not incapable of
using the opposite types, which were more related to principled moral judgment.
Moreover, mature personality development included the practice of using the less
preferred types (Myers et al., 2003).
If a person who preferred Feeling was not naturally drawn to the objectivity and
impersonality of Kantian autonomy and rationalism, mature type development would
allow that Feeling person to use the Thinking preference well enough to incorporate
moral principles. Similarly, people who preferred Thinking may have been naturally
drawn toward autonomy and impersonality, but those people should develop the Feeling
aspect of personality well enough to develop and incorporate values into their
rationalism.
The humanistic rationalism of Kant, the cognitive psychology of Kohlberg, the
personality typology of Myers and Briggs, and even Christian theology all assume a basic
human dignity from which each person can develop to healthy personal fulfillment.
Researchers have generally found Introversion (I), Intuition (N), Thinking (T) and
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Perceiving (P) to be influences on higher levels of moral judgment. One’s MBTI type
preference was an influence on the path to one’s moral development but was not the
arbitrator of one’s moral development. Personality was not destiny.

MBTI and Christians
MBTI personality preferences have been shown to be related to moral judgment.
Some researchers have also reported certain type preferences were over- or
underrepresented among Christians. Additionally, some researchers have found particular
personality types were more predictive of vocational interest in ministry.
Childerston (1985) reported moral reasoning was related to fundamentalist
theology and type preference was related to level of fundamentalism, making type
preference indirectly related to moral reasoning among Bible college students.
Childerston noted this was an important distinction because unlike moral stages, no type
was presumed to be better than another. The key to moral development for Bible college
students with the Sensing preference, who were overrepresented in the Bible college, was
in mature type development in which people exercised their secondary preferences (i.e.,
Intuition).
College students with higher DIT scores were found by Volker (1979) to be less
religiously active than the average (as cited in Rest, 1986) for college students. This
could have been a factor of the Extraversion/Introversion dichotomy. Introverts were
more likely to score well on tests and less likely to be involved in any social communities
(Myers et al., 2003). If actively religious people were more likely to be Extraverts, and
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Extraverts scored lower on the DIT, it may have been Extraversion and not religious
activity that was directly related to lower levels of moral judgment.
MBTI preferences bore tremendous relationships with individuals’ interests in
religion, moral autonomy and vocational ministry. Table 2 shows type preferences related
to such issues. ISTPs, INTPs, INFPs and ENTPs were the four groups most likely to rank
“autonomy” as “very important.” ISFJs, ESFPs, ESFJs and INFJs were most likely to
rank “spirituality” as “very important” (Myers et al., 2003, p. 315). INTPs were the most
likely type to desire autonomy, while ESFJs were the least likely to desire autonomy.
Conversely, INTPs were least likely to desire spirituality, while ESFJs were most likely
to desire spirituality.
Table 2
Type Correlation with Values and Careers
Type
ISFJ
INFJ
ISTP
INFP
INTP
ESFP
ENFP
ENTP
ESFJ
ENFJ

Values
Autonomy
X
X
Xa

Values
Spirituality
X
X

Vocational
Ministry
X

Y
X
X

X
Y

Xa

X
X

Note. Data collected from Myers et al., 2003. Xa = Type with highest correlation to
descriptor. Y = Type with lowest correlation to descriptor.
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The types most likely to enter careers in ministry were INFJ, ISFJ, ENFP, ENFJ
and ESFJ. Ministry careers were among the 10 most common careers for 6 of the 8
Feeling (F) types. Additionally, the five types most likely to enter vocational ministry
included all four FJ types (INFJ, ISFJ, ENFJ and ESFJ). Notably, vocational ministry
was not listed as one of the 10 most likely careers for any Thinking (T) type. Vocational
ministry was one of the 10 least likely careers for INTP, ENTP, ENTJ, ESTP, ISTP,
ISTJ, accounting for six of the eight Thinking (T) types (Myers et al., 2003). The Feeling
preference was highly related to ministry careers, while the Thinking preference was a
clear predictor of disinterest in ministry careers.
The relationships between MBTI preferences and religious vocations were studied
by Ruppart (1985). Catholic priests and nuns were likely to be ISFJs. Protestant and
Jewish clergy were frequently ENFJs. Considering all clergy together, nearly four-fifths
were Feeling (F) oriented and almost three-quarters were Judging (J) oriented. The
ministerial type was FJ, while fewer than one in ten clergy were NTs or SPs. Phoon
(1987) found ESFJs were significantly overrepresented among Seventh Day Adventist
clergy.
The findings relating to types among clergy did not indicate that people of less
common types were ill-suited for ministry. The MBTI was not a career placement test. In
Phoon’s (1987) study of Seventh Day Adventists, she found Introverts (I) often found
ways to serve through behind-the-scenes activities, such as prayer. Those participants
who saw themselves as church leaders, whether pastoral leaders, or managerial leaders,
were more likely to have Extraverted (E) preferences. In another study of career
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satisfaction among clergy, Thinkers (T) were more satisfied with administrative
responsibilities, while Sensors (S) were more satisfied with interpersonal responsibilities
(Johnson, 1991).
Three important studies involved investigations of personality types among
Southern Baptist ministers. Whelchel (1996) studied MBTI type frequencies of 2,630
Southern Baptist missionaries which accounted for three-quarters of all SBC
missionaries. Whelchel obtained the data from the SBC which had administered the
MBTI to every new missionary for the previous decade. He found Sensing (S) and
Feeling (F) preferences were most common. However, Intuitive (N) types were most
likely to persevere in missions. Sanson (2000) studied Southern Baptist pastors seeking
the Doctor of Ministry degree and found Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences were
the most common and overrepresented among the pastors. Berryhill (1991) found Feeling
(F) was overrepresented among seminarians at the Southern Baptist Theological
Seminary.
The Berryhill (1991), Whelchel (1996) and Sanson (2000) studies bore significant
relevance for this program evaluation, but they also involved some distinctions from this
research. Berryhill studied students at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in
Lousiville, KY . Whechel studied international missionaries. Sanson studied professional
doctoral students. In general, their findings supported the common findings that Sensing
(S), Feeling (F) and Judging (J) preferences were overrepresented among ministers.
Bramer (1995) also found S, F and J preferences were related to ministerial careers
among evangelical ministers. Further, Bramer found type differences were related to
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preferences for types of ministerial roles and the social attributes individuals preferred in
their churches.
Sensing and Judging preferences on the MBTI have been found to be predictive
of conventional moral reasoning among Bible college students. Intuitive (N) preferences
were predictive of less fundamentalist theology than Sensing (S) preferences among
Bible college students (Childerston, 1985). Lee (1985) found MBTI personality types
related to significant differences in commitment to the theological tenants of one’s
church. The Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences predicted greater commitment. SF
and J preferences were overrepresented among religiously conservative males. Harman
(1982) found the Feeling (F) preference was overrepresented among students entering a
Church of Christ college.
People with a preference for Sensing (S) tended to seek hands-on careers. Those
who preferred Feeling (F) sought careers that combined “service” and were
“harmonious.” Those with a preference for Judging (J) sought careers that operated
according to a “system and order.” The fit between SFJ preferences and ministerial
careers was clear. By contrast, the Intuitive (N) preference led toward careers involving
“new problems to be solved.” The Perceiving (P) preference led toward work based on
“understanding situations; Thinking (T) led to careers with “logical…ideas” (Myers et
al., 2003, p. 293.) The inclinations of NTP types, who were very unlikely to enter
ministry, fit more closely with Kohlberg’s theory than did the inclinations of SFJs who
were quite likely to enter ministry.
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MBTI and Prisoners
Very little research has been conducted to learn about personality types and
criminology. Lippin (1988) investigated personality types among female prisoners in
Maryland. Livernoise (1987) studied personality types among male prisoners in the
Orange County, FL jail. Combined, their studies provided interesting information on
personalities and criminal behavior. Their studies, however, were limited to small
populations and were not necessarily generalizable.
Thinking (T) was overrepresented among the females (Lippin, 1988); the
preference for Thinking (T) was especially pronounced in women convicted of crimes
involving drugs or violence. Livernoise (1987), whose findings are displayed in Table 3,
found Feeling (F) to be overrepresented among males. Lippin’s finding that Thinking (T)
was related to criminal behavior was counterintuitive. One possible interpretation may be
a relationship between low levels of education and criminal behavior in Thinkers (T).
Perhaps the low education common among the female prisoners restricted the women’s
ability to adequately utilize their Thinking (T) preferences. Lippin and Livernoise both
found Introverts (I) were overrepresented among the incarcerated populations.
The inclusion of males in Livernoise’s (1987) study was particularly relevant to
this research project. In general, Livernoise found the Intituition (I), Sensing (S) and
Feeling (F) preferences were related to incarceration, while Extraversion (E), Intuition
(N) and Thinking (T) types were underrepresented. SJs and FJs were overrepresented
among those convicted of sexual crimes. IPs were overrepresented among inmates
convicted of violent crimes and EPs were overrepresented among crimes involving theft.
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Table 3
Relationships between Personality and Criminal Charges
Charge

Types Overrepresented

Types Underrepresented

All Charges

ISTP, ESFP, ESFJ, I, S,
F, SP, SF, TP

INTJ, ISFP, ESTJ, ENTJ,
E, N, T, IN, NT, EJ

Murder

IP

Sexual Misconduct

ESFJ, J, SJ, FJ

Kidnapping

INFP, IN

Drugs

ENTJ, EJ

All Personal Assault

INFP

P

EP

Burglary, Theft, and Robbery ENFP, EP
Note. Data collected from Livernoise (1987). Study included 298 inmates at a county
jail.

MBTI and LSP
Overall, the literature on the DIT and the MBTI did not indicate LSP Seminary
students should have been expected to do well on a measure of moral judgment. Table 4
provides a synthesis of findings concerning the DIT and MBTI as related to this study.
Prisoners typically had very low moral judgment abilities. Christians, as well,
frequently scored below comparative averages on the DIT. The review of data on the
MBTI revealed the MBTI preferences most common to Christians, ministers, prisoners,
and blacks were all predictive of lower than average DIT scores. Quite simply, the LSP
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Seminary students were expected to have most personality type factors working against
them.
Table 4
Personality Relationships to Descriptors
Descriptors

Types Overrepresented

High P score

N, T, P, IP

Low P score

S, F, J

Prisoners

I, S, F, SP, SF, IP

Ministers

S, F, J

Religious

S, F, J, SF

Theology
This program evaluation was intended to measure the success of the NOBTS
program at LSP in promoting moral development among students. In order to devise a
method for such an evaluation, it was necessary to have an understanding of moral
development theory. Equally important, however, was to understand what moral
philosophy was most fitting for an evaluation of the Seminary. An appropriate program
evaluation cannot measure the program against a standard incongruent with the program
curriculum and goals.
Kohlberg’s (1966) developmental model of morality was just one of many moral
philosophies. The literature concerning Kohlberg’s model and Christian populations was
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mixed. Some researchers reported no significant relationship between religiosity and
morality. Other researchers found a negative relationship between Christianity and moral
judgment. Few researchers found religiosity to be beneficial to moral development.
While Kohlberg (1966) and the theological frame of the Seminary diverged in
significant areas, these differences were not so great as to negate the use of Kohlberg’s
theory within a Christian context. Further, the literature reviewed indicated Baptist
theology was principled in terms of Kohlberg’s model.

Kohlberg and Theology
Kohlberg’s (1967) bias against religion and his limited understanding of religion
led him to misinterpret Christianity is some ways that negatively affect Christians
evaluated using his model. These issues, once understood, may serve to bridge the gap
between Kohlberg and Christianity and lead to more valid evaluations of Kohlberg, the
DIT, and Christian moral programs.
Kohlberg’s (1967) conclusion that religion was extraneous to moral development
was meaningless, because Kohlberg defined religion by religious affiliation (Lee, 1980).
Religious scholars considered self-identified religious affiliation to be minimally related
to actual religiosity. Kohlberg’s conclusions were biased by definition of religious belief.
The stages of Christian beliefs were directly compared to the stages of moral
development by Kohlberg and Power (1981). Stage 3 was based on relationships in both
Christian faith and moral development. Stage 3 religious thinking was described as
defining sin as acts leading to embarrassment before God. In stage 4, moral decisions
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were deferred to God’s law. Stage 5 reasoning was based on the social contract and
included God as a partner in the contract. In this stage, Kohlberg believed religion helped
to supplement moral reasoning with a sense of meaning. Stage 6 was represented by
luminaries, such as Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi, and Mother Teresa (Kohlberg &
Power, 1981).
Despite Kohlberg’s (1967) antagonism toward religious moral education, he
noticed an undeniable relationship between religiosity and the people who he deemed
most moral. Kohlberg considered Martin Luther King and Thomas Aquinas to be
examples of stage 6 reasoning because both were determined to satisfy universal moral
standards that were transcendental rather than governmental. Such transcendental moral
principles were of paramount importance to Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Power, 1981;
Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990).
Kohlberg and Power (1981) praised the moral concern of Christian theology but
also declared that concern to be lower level thinking. They viewed the connection
between God and the believer as inconsistent with autonomy.
Christianity and Judaism…view God’s principal concern as being not for cultic
worship but for love and justice. They emphasize that to be in harmony with God
people must act morally, but they also stress that people must rely on God in order
to live a moral life. (p. 321)
On one hand, Christians believed in principles of love (agape) and justice. On the
other hand, Christians believed in obeying God’s call for love and justice. For Kohlberg
and Power (1981), the externality of God defiled Christian principles.
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Kohlberg and Power (1981) continued to make the same mistakes as past
secularists. According to Beach (1952), secular rationalist philosophers, such as Kant,
accepted the role of religion in the morality of some of humanity’s greatest heroes. They
treated each hero’s religion, however, as if it were somehow superfluous and dependent
upon the innate qualities of the individuals (Beach). The error led such philosophers to
the conclusion that true morality was always independent of religion.
Ferre (1951) explained Kierkegaard’s theology of the relationship between God
and good:
God and the true good cannot be separated. God does not do the good because the
good is primary, nor does the good depend upon any arbitrary decree of deity.
God is and does the good because his nature is and constitutes the nature of
goodness. In so far as man knows the good, that far he knows God, and hence that
good cannot be suspended without both violation of the ethical order and sinning
against God. (pp. 246-247)
When Kohlberg evaluated Christians using his model, the Christians were
evaluated as much by the semantics of their responses as by the meaning of those
responses (Kohlberg & Power, 1981). It was not enough for Christians to appeal to love
or justice; the Christians must have appealed using the right phraseology.
The Golden Rule was cited by Kohlberg (1973) as an example of principled
reasoning because it was abstract. He contrasted the biblical imperative of the Golden
Rule to the Ten Commandments which he stated were more concrete and legalistic. Still,
the Golden Rule, according to Kohlberg (1973), was not always principled. Kohlberg
(1973) claimed the Golden Rule could also be used in stage 3 or stage 6 reasoning. The
variable nature of the Golden Rule led Kohlberg to conclude Christian moral philosophy
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had no inherent moral stage. This conclusion, once again, reinforced Kohlberg’s belief
that religion was naturally inactive in moral development and merely supported moral
reasoning achieved autonomously.
Comparing the biblical system to the Kohlbergian system was a method toward
evaluating the compatibility of Christian theology and Kohlberg’s philosophy. According
to Aron (1977), in stage 4 reasoning “morality is conceived of as simply obeying existing
laws and rules” (p. 206). In Stage 5, “morality is seen as transcending civil society and
pertaining to the rights and duties of humanity as a whole” (p. 206). Finally, “the stage 6
individual sees it as his or her duty to enforce the rights of others” (p. 206). Analyzed in
these terms, Christianity most closely fits stage 6. A difficulty in assigning stage 6 to
Christian theology, however, was applying Kohlberg’s (1981) own determination that
stealing the drug was a duty for everyone because all persons would want the drug stolen
if they were in the situation of Heinz’s wife.
Baptist theology was unmistakably principled in many other ways. For example,
Kohlberg (1982) cited liberty of conscience as principled stage 5 philosophy. The
Christian theology of love (agape) was especially central to understanding both Kohlberg
and Christianity. Kohlberg and Power (1981) considered the Christian theology of agape
to be consistent with the highest stage of moral reasoning. Agape, constituting overriding,
universal and consistent love for others and was a principal factor of Christianity. The
authors also noted that while love, was a general religious theme, Christian agape was
especially comprehensive and principled. They contrasted the active morality of agape
with the passive doctrine of karma.
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Kohlberg and Power (1981) addressed the question of whether the moral apex of
agape, based in love, was in conflict with justice. In their conclusion, agape presupposed
justice and was, therefore, not in conflict. The idea of agape progressing from justice then
raised the question of whether agape was superior to justice, and therefore a seventh
stage. They believed agape and justice were so interconnected that neither could be said
to supersede the other. Agape and justice were coequal. Kohlberg and Power’s
explanation, however, did not entirely resolve their questions. They noted a community
of Christians would “work selflessly together for one end, the glory of God as defined by
their common religion” (p. 352). Yet they failed to address exactly how such people
would respond to moral dilemma questions and why they would not be categorized as
stage 4 thinkers for appealing to their external religion. Instead of directly answering such
questions, Kohlberg and Power appealed to a perceived flexibility in their model.
The key to higher order thinking was the abstract concern for justice, rather than
the outcome of that justice. Christians could appeal to God’s glory as an outcome of just
thinking, while devotees of other philosophies could appeal to other ideal outcomes. So,
it was clear Kohlberg and Power (1981) believed actualized Christians would be stage 6
thinkers. The question remained as to whether actualized Christians would be scored as
principled thinkers using Kohlberg’s methodology.

Stage 7
Kohlberg and Power (1981) noted that while pure reason could provide
knowledge of what should be done in a given situation, reason could not provide
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motivation to do right when the costs became great. At that point, religion became a great
basis for people to bear the costs of morality. Unfortunately, Kohlberg and Power (1981)
treated religion, not as a true source of motivation, but as a psychological source. In other
words, religion was much like a crutch for weak-willed people to build the courage to act
on the morals they knew were just.
Kohlberg and Power (1981) argued the Christian concept of agape was in addition
to the basic concept of justice. In their theory of a stage 7, based on agape, they defined
agape as an act beyond the call of moral duty. This was a great addition but not
necessary to achieve optimal stage 6 morality.
Many Christians were grappling with the complexity of moral dilemmas and the
demands of justice well before Kohlberg began his research. For many Christians, agape
was not an addition to morality, but the essence of morality. Justice was a foundation for
many Christian ethics, but justice was insufficient in itself. A religion or ethic absent of
agape would not bear any resemblance to Christianity. At the same time, the Christian
ethic was based on the presumed foundation of justice.
Several years before Kohlberg wrote his dissertation that began his career, Beach
(1952) foreshadowed Kohlberg and Power’s (1981) stage 7.
A Christian social ethics can be based on the Bible only in a derivative sense….
Biblical morality throws light only obliquely on such pressing moral questions as
the relation of justice and love, the criterion for choice among competing
neighbor-claims, the issue of compromise and strategy within a social order which
constricts all feasible choices down to evil options, the dialectic of freedom and
order, etc. These are the central working problems of the Christian in the social
arena. The New Testament ‘law of love’ can and must preside over the Christian
debate on these matters, but in itself it is a remote judge. Mutually selfcontradictory policies can often claim its sanction. (p. 116)
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In the moral systems of Kant, Rawls and Kohlberg, development consisted
partially of deciding what to value. For the Christian, the ultimate values were
established. The abstract and cognitive question for Christians was how to apply those
values. A Christian could not live out Christian ethics by following rules or developing
the habits of virtue. The Bible served as a resource for the Christian to interpret what
principles existed (e.g., love and justice), but the Bible did not contain rules for the
knowing the loving and just action for a particular time and place. The Christian, then,
must have thought about the situation and chosen the morally right action (Beach, 1952).

Theology as Contemplation
The creation of a new social order reliant upon the justice of God was argued for
by Tyndale (2000/1528). While he did not believe in the usurpation of the divinely
ordained rulers, he did believe in a civil disobedience that refused to acquiesce to
injustice. His thinking and reflection about God led him to take moral actions regardless
of the temporal law. For the Christian, critical thinking was expected. Protestant theology
considered human rationality to separate humankind from other creatures (Beach, 1952).
Kantian ethicists misconstrued the abusive records of many churches and nations,
operating under the name of Christianity, to be, in fact, Christianity (Ferre, 1951). The
reality, however, was that Christianity theology consisted of a far more autonomous and
principled ethical system. Still, it would be going too far to link Christian ethics with the
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strict humanism of Kant. Ferre’s view of Christian theology informed a far more
balanced ethic of freedom, one balanced by an authority that enlivened freedom.
The simplest way to exhibit this relationship between authority and autonomy in
the Christian faith is to define the nature of Christian authority…. We Christians
have no magic book to be used indiscriminately, unintelligently, and woodenly.
Such an authority would indeed make us guilty of heteronomous ethics…! Nor do
we accept the decrees of an infallible human institution with the keys to bind the
consciences of men…. If any organization of men could decree for other men
what their eternal obligation is and substitute such decrees for people’s own moral
insight and conscience, we certainly should have a damaging moral
heteronomy…. The nature of Christian authority is, rather, the love of God in
Christ Jesus…. Christian love by its very nature bestows freedom on the objects
of its love. God is not concerned with the manufacture of puppets but with the
maturing of children…. Not only is this authority thus not inconsistent with
freedom, but, in fact, agape as authority expresses its very self by the creation and
the fostering of such freedom. In this sense, then, authority and autonomy both
coincide and reinforce each other…. Christian authority is of such a nature as to
effect autonomy. Therefore the distinction between the two concepts is false….
(pp. 249-250)
Waltke (1995) similarly argued for a moral theonomy based on the individual’s
“sound judgment,” used in conjunction with the Bible and the Holy Spirit (p. 143). The
Christian use of rationality, however, was preceded by an understanding that “God’s
Word is certain; human reason is less certain” (p. 145). Therefore, the Christian did not
disregard the Bible. The Christian used reason to apply biblical principles.
Most secular philosophy scholars misconstrued Kant to be more antagonistic to
religion than was warranted by his writings (Hare, 2001). According to Hare, Kant did
not argue moral laws were entirely self-created. Instead, Kant sought to find a way in
which moral law was not homocentric or theocentric but was eternally pre-existent with
God. Through such a philosophy, Kant’s appeals to moral law were not appeals to manmade law or God-made law but simply to law.
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Kant believes that autonomy is not only consistent with submission to political
authority, but requires that submission. His argument is that coercion by the state
is necessary in order to prevent coercion by individuals…. External compulsion
by the state is thus ‘a hindering of the hindrances to freedom…. It is only within a
civil condition , where there is a legislator to enact laws, an executive to enforce
them, and a judiciary to settle disputes about rights by reference to such public
laws, that human beings can do what it can be known a priori they must be able to
do in accordance with moral principles….’ A citizen is in this way morally
justified in adopting into her own will the will of the ruler. The analogy with
God’s rule is systematic…. God can punish and reward us. As we have already
seen, this is not supposed to be the ground for our obedience. But it is essentially
tied to the way in which God can be the author of the obligation to obey the law
in a way that we are not. (pp. 109-110)
Baptist Individualism
According to Shurden (1998), the foundation for a distinction of Baptists was the
consistent focus on liberty and conscience. Baptists were among the most individualistic
denominations and pioneers in the concept of democracy (Harkness, 1939). Shurden
traced Baptist beliefs in individualism and freedom of conscience back to the 1600s, a
century before Kant.
While there has been a long academic and historical attempt to define Baptists,
there were certain distinctions marking Baptist theology. One such distinction was
religious autonomy. “For Baptists, private interpretation of Scripture is not a postEnlightenment appropriation of democratic individualism and egalitarianism; it is part of
their earliest seventeenth-century heritage” (Shurden, 1998, paragraph 20). John Leland,
an 18th century Baptist, considered conscience to be fallible because humans did not
always have the information necessary for rational decisions. Still, he believed a free
conscience was far superior to government law (Moore, 1965). Williams, a 17th century
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Baptist, was the first English writer to firmly set forth a principled claim for freedom of
conscience and the first political leader to establish a system for the absolute protection of
freedom of conscience (Noonan, 1987).

Baptists and Principled Morality
Baptists were early pioneers of human rights and had always emphasized issues of
justice and freedom. A major difference between Baptist principles of human rights and
humanistic principles, however, was that Baptists based their principles on theology, not
sociology (Shurden, 1998). Baptists were arguing for extensive human rights (see
Helwys, 1997/1612) decades before Hobbes (1997/1651), who was a forerunner of liberal
humanism, was even arguing for the most basic right to life. According to Shurden:
What distinguished early Baptists was the conviction that all human beings,
redeemed or not, have a God-given freedom to follow conscience in matters
spiritual and religion. Early Baptists, as did other Christians of their time,
assumed that freedom for living fully, authentically, and genuinely was found in
Christ. Where Baptists differed with their culture was believing that people had as
a gift from God the right to choose that path. Freedom came with creation, as well
as redemption…. The origin of human rights is not found in the rationalism and
individualism of the Enlightenment but in the free churches at the time of the
Puritan Revolution. (paragraph 48)
The religious and political actions of Williams served as a prime example of early
Baptist principles. Williams founded Rhode Island as the first government in the world to
grant absolute freedom of conscience to all its residents. He specified Rhode Island’s
freedom would be available to all, including Jews, Muslims and atheists (Harkness,
1939). While modern democracy was theoretically rooted in Enlightenment philosophy,
the Enlightenment philosophy was rooted in Calvinist theology. Although Williams
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thought Quakers heretics, he ensured them absolute freedom of conscience within Rhode
Island. Rather than use political power against those he considered heretics, he used
preaching and writing in an attempt to show their errors (Moore, 1965).
To a great extent, modern political democracy was created by Williams
(Harkness, 1939). Williams’ writings on freedom of conscience were influential to the
development of John Locke, who became a pivotal inspiration for the American
Revolution (Moore, 1965). Williams recognized that the specific formation of a
government system was somewhat arbitrary, that numerous types of systems existed
throughout the world, and that many successful governments had existed in non-Christian
nations. Still, within the range of options available, Williams insisted a government’s
legitimacy grew from the sanction of the citizens not any divine right granted to
autocrats. Therefore, Williams outlined a legitimate rationale for revolution, based on the
will of the people, more than a century before the US Declaration of Independence made
a similar assertion (Harkness).
Williams argued the purpose of government was to preserve the natural freedom
of each individual from the dangers of the state of nature, where everyone was free yet
felt no security because he or she could be abused by anyone stronger (Harkness, 1939).
Williams was outlining a liberal political philosophy well before Hobbes (1997/1612)
challenged divine right and theorized the state of nature. The political and philosophical
advances of Williams, according to Moore (1965), made it easy for many to categorize
him as “an Enlightened secular liberal,” or “as primarily a political thinker,” (p. 58), but
Williams was first and foremost a Puritan clergyman. As Moore stated, “Williams
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was…distinguished from other New England Calvinists only by the consistency with
which he carried to conclusion some of the implications of assumptions common to them
all” (p. 58).

Authority and Autonomy in Baptist Theology
According to Cullen (1998), the medieval church made the error of presenting
their doctrine as the infallible rule, and thus creating an idol. In contrast, the
Enlightenment thinkers made their own understanding the infallible rule, creating a
different idol. Cullen argued, however, that Christian theology required both doctrine and
rationality to serve as tools for interpreting the actual infallible tool, the Bible. Protestants
held a tension between biblical authority and personal religious autonomy (Beach, 1952).
Rationalism insisted people could not turn to external inspiration for moral
conviction and that people must have sought their own realization above all else.
Rationalists, such as Kant, misunderstood the concept of theological authority, however.
According to Beach (1952), Christians believed theological commitment was so
internalized that it was an internal source of wisdom.
For when the self really acknowledges the sovereignty of God over him, that
acknowledgement is an inward appropriation so intense that the self no longer
feels the authority to be something ‘over against’ him, something hostile to his
true self, but rather the expression of his true self. The authority now compels him
from within, not from without. (p. 111)
Christianity was not a religion of prescription. It was a religion of incredible
thought and purpose in decision making. Beach (1952) and Waltke (1995) asserted
Christians enjoyed tremendous latitude of morally right action within their daily lives.
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Augustine described Christian moral action thusly, “Love God and do what you want” (as
cited in Beach, p. 110).
While Catholic theology instituted the Church hierarchy as a source for absolute,
trustworthy truth, Protestants had no such authority outside the Bible. Protestants had no
chair from which a pope could proclaim ex cathedra. Protestants had no Catechism to
interpret and apply the Bible for them. Protestants must have individually and
collectively grappled with issues and hermeneutics. Beach (1952) described the
Catholic/Protestant dichotomy as one of a difference of religious authority. “It is
precisely the Protestant genius…to criticize under the Judgment of God, the finality of
any finite authority as representing exhaustively the authority of the Infinite” (p. 112).
Protestants welcomed reason into the moral debate. Still, Protestants treated reason
differently than the rationalists. “Reason has an authoritative role. But it was a secondary
role, to illumine the witness of the Word when the words were dark or obscure” (p. 113).
According to Kohlberg (1966), stage 6 thinkers used their “conscience as a
directing agent” (p. 7). This was within the theological concepts of Waltke (1995) and
Packer (1993). The role of conscience was integral to biblical morality.

Christian Education
Southern Baptists have traditionally placed great importance on education,
especially higher education. In fact, the Baptist Faith and Message, which outlined the
general beliefs of Southern Baptists, included an article on the establishment of a system
of higher education. Hobbs (1971), one of the 20th century’s most influential Baptist
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leaders, was instrumental in formulating the Baptist Faith and Message. According to
Hobbs, “Since all social injustice is rooted in sin in the human heart, efforts for
improving the social order and establishing righteousness must begin in the regeneration
of the individual person” (p. 129). Clearly, Southern Baptists were concerned with
education and social justice.
While Baptists had been significantly involved in higher education, they also had
an historical commitment to education in churches. Moral development was a central
focus in both realms of education. Dockery (2000), as the president of a Southern Baptist
college, had suggested Christian higher education must be committed to moral
development and that cognitive development was a significant factor in moral
development. Tidwell (1996), who was a leading scholar in the study of church
education, argued the educational mission of a church relied on the proper critical
thinking of Christians. Baptist churches and Baptist colleges were expected to encourage
Christians to think critically and question their faith as a means of developing more
mature faith.
Baptists were involved in American higher education from an early stage.
Baptists, and particularly Southern Baptists, had a rich tradition in higher education,
having founded many of America’s great schools such as Brown, George Washington,
Mercy and Baylor Universities. In fact, Brown University was uniquely Baptist among
the early American universities. The Baptist theology of individual liberty led Brown to
hold “the most liberal character” of the Ivy League schools. Brown was also noteworthy
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in that “all members [of its community] were to enjoy full, free, absolute, and
uninterrupted liberty of conscience” (Johnson, 1955, p. 5).
According to Johnson (1955), Baptist colleges were also especially focused on the
moral development of students. “The main purpose in the [biblical] educational
philosophy…[was] the development of noble individual character, the motivating force in
Christian men and women who, in consequence, would stand for and promote social
justice. Christian educators today proclaim that same purpose” (Johnson, 1955, p. 1).
Johnson discussed social justice as an outcome of education prior to Kohlberg’s or
Rawls’s work.
The research of Kohlberg and Fowler was used by Cullen (1998) to outline the
necessity of critical reflection in the moral and spiritual development of Christians. Such
an educational pedagogy was intended to holistically develop the Christian student.
Christians, according to Cullen, were obligated to earnestly think about and evaluate their
faith.
The primary functions of Christian education, according to Tidwell (1996), were
to promote Christian involvement in issues of social justice. If the church was to teach
principles of moral conduct, social justice, and critical thinking, Kohlberg’s theory and
the DIT should be significantly related to the church’s mission. One reason so many
researchers have found lower reasoning in some Christian populations may be the failure
of some religious education. Schultz and Schultz (1996) believed one problem with
church education was a frequent absence of attention to critical thinking despite
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understanding that critical thinking was essential to fulfillment of the church’s
educational mission.
In a survey by Hoge et al. (1982), religious educators and Christian parents were
asked about their foci in church curriculum development. Baptist educators agreed “the
main goals of Christian education” include promoting “justice in the local community”
(pp. 233-234). Baptist educators ranked “justice” higher than educators from Church of
God, Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal and Catholic churches. Only Methodist parents
ranked “justice” higher than Baptist parents. Hoge et al. showed tremendous support for
social, political and critical thinking in church education among Baptist parents and
educators.
Despite high interest in justice, Baptists ranked the educational goals, “the
struggle for justice is a rightful concern of the church,” and “shows concern about
liberation of oppressed people,” lower than members of any of the other denominations.
Baptists were also lowest ranking the statements, “willing to work publicly to protest
social wrongs” and in “appreciates his or her personal responsibility as a Christian for
combating social evils” (Hoge et al., 1982, pp. 233-234).
In critical thinking statements, both Baptist parents and educators ranked the goal
of “evaluate the different claims” of other faiths higher than people of other
denominations (Hoge et al., 1982, p. 234). Baptist educators were second (insignificantly
behind Episcopalians) on the statement, “understands Christianity both from within his or
her own tradition and also critically, as if from outside.” Baptist parents were highest on
that statement of critical thinking. Baptist educators were highest in “responsible view
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toward moral questions.” Both Baptist educators and parents were highest in “values the
Bible as inspiration for personal spiritual growth,” “can identify important assumptions
and implications of Christian teachings,” and “distinguishes between the values of culture
and the values of the Gospel” (pp. 234-235). Baptists ranked “reflective understanding”
of their faith and “moral maturity” higher than any denomination (p. 238).
A key to understanding these differences was found in what members of
denominations ranked as most important. Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal and
Catholic educators ranked “has a healthy self-concept” higher than any other goal.
Conversely, Baptist educators ranked “has a personal relationship with Jesus Christ” as
the primary goal (Hoge et al., 1982, p. 236).
Baptists ranked statements regarding broad moral principles such as justice higher
than other denominations. When the questions concerned social action, however, Baptists
ranked the statements lower than did members of mainline denominations. A possible
explanation is the obvious connotation of such action with the liberalism of the 1960s and
1970s. In broad terms, Baptists considered social issues and religious critical thinking
extremely important. When asked whether Christian youth should be encouraged to
march in local protests, however, the Baptists were not as supportive (Hoge et al., 1982).
Baptists believed social injustice should be fought by the church, but likely did
not want their churches to become the liberal bastions other denominations had become
since the 1970s. The distinction in mission was exemplified by the evangelical focus on
conversion and the mainline focus on self-esteem. Liberal denominations ranked goals of
Unitarianism and theological uncertainty as being supremely important. Religious
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conviction and morality were most important to Southern Baptists, and to a lesser extent
Church of God members. Taken as a whole, the results of the study supported the
contention that Southern Baptist religious educators and parents take issues of justice and
critical thinking more seriously than do members of the other five denominations.
According to Stubblefield (1993), “Spiritual maturity includes the ability to make
ethical and moral decisions in keeping with the Christian faith” (p. 168). Reinsmith
(1995) argued Christians were obligated to think critically about their faith so as to
separate false doctrines from those that could be carried forward. Even then, Christians
were to maintain a “healthy doubt” which would lead to the development rather than
destruction of faith. Baptists were believers in absolute, universal principles and in the
importance of critical reflection and social justice. These values and practices of Baptists
were well aligned with the theoretical foundations of Kohlberg and Rest.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Introduction
In 1995, the federal government cut Higher Education Act funding for educational
rehabilitation programs. The warden at Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP), Burl Cain,
began thinking of new ways to educate the prisoners (Frink, 2004). Cain partnered with
the Judson Baptist Association, Louisiana Baptist Convention, and the New Orleans
Baptist Theological Seminary (NOBTS) to bring a privately funded theological education
to the prison (Baker, 2000).
NOBTS and LSP created a college program offering associate and bachelor’s
degrees to prison inmates. The prison college opened in 1995, awarded its first associate
degrees in 1998 and its first bachelor’s degrees in 2000 (Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections, 2000). In 2004, LSP was the only prison in the United States
offering bachelor’s degrees to inmates (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections, 2000; 2001). The LSP campus of NOBTS was one of 17 NOBTS extension
centers and was regionally accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools (Frink, 2002; Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2001)
A primary goal of the Seminary was the moral development of students. Warden
Cain had said, “I wish other prison wardens could realize what we learned—that the only
rehabilitation is moral rehabilitation” (Frink, 2004, p. 39). Robert Toney, a chaplain at
Angola, had also emphasized the moral nature of the Seminary program in his statement
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“Moral rehabilitation is the only rehabilitation that works. If you just have education,
what you have done is just created a smarter criminal. The change must come from
within” (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005, p. 108).
Cain viewed faith-based efforts as the most promising development in criminal
rehabilitation. He has said “nothing else but [the religious programs] should get the credit
[for Angola’s change]. We always had the educational programs. The only thing we did
different was we brought God to Angola” (Frink, 2004, p. 39). The program was
considered such a success in 2004 that wardens from prisons in other states were asking
NOBTS to consider opening campuses at their prisons (Myers, 2004). NOBTS
subsequently opened a new campus at the Mississippi State Penitentiary and the
Seminary was developing programs in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama (Myers, 2005).

Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study was to conduct a program evaluation for the Seminary
at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP). Specifically, this study was designed to
evaluate the program’s effect on the moral development of students at LSP. An attempt
was made to include a census of all students in the LSP Seminary population.
The evaluation of the Seminary at LSP was important as various national policies
continued to emphasize faith-based initiatives, while other policies led to America
imprisoning a higher ratio of its population than any other nation in the world (Mauer,
2003). The study of moral development was a salient issue to the American public, as
well (Rest et al., 1999). From the frames of higher education, political science and
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criminal justice scholarship, this program evaluation was thought to be potentially helpful
to researchers, administrators, policy makers and bureaucrats in making more informed
and effective decisions. This evaluation could also serve social scientists and
philosophers in terms of advancing their understanding of the social, psychological and
spiritual development of human beings.
Despite the relevance of this program to so many fields of scholarship, no
previously published studies concerning the Seminary at LSP were located during the
review of the literature and related research. Searches were conducted through a variety
of databases, including Dissertation Abstracts, ERIC, Professional Development
Collection and Academic Search Premier. This program evaluation stood to fill an
important gap in scholarship.

Primary Research Question
To what extent do students in the NOBTS program at LSP develop moral
judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for
effective ministry?

Research Question 1a
What, if any, statistically significant differences exist in the moral judgment of
freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary students?
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Research Question 1b
What, if any, statistically significant relationships exist between the moral
judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types?

Population and Sample
The LSP Seminary program enrolled 101 students in the fall 2005 semester.
Because the population was relatively small and the measurement instruments allowed
groups to be evaluated at reasonable costs, the entire program population was invited to
participate in the study. The DIT-1 and DIT-2 required moderate reading levels (Rest et
al., 2000). Consequently, the use of a control group was determined to be impractical.
Appropriate reading levels could not be assured for any random group of prisoners
outside the college program.
While an attempt was made to include a census of the population, all participants
were informed of their rights, including the right to not participate. Particular attention
was made to practice informed consent consistent with the Common Rule subsection on
research involving prisoners (45 CFR 46, subpart C).
In addition to the involvement of the program population, additional data were
gathered from the full-time faculty of NOBTS. The data gathered from the faculty were
used in conjunction with program population data for the purpose of better addressing the
overall research question posed in this study. Faculty data served as a benchmark for
student moral development.

107

The original plan for the program evaluation included a census of the 66 full-time
NOBTS main campus faculty. The faculty members were to be provided research
materials, including informed consent, during one of their periodic faculty meetings. In
September 2005, however, Hurricane Katrina caused the evacuation of the main campus
and the dispersing of the Seminary faculty.
The Seminary administration, comprised of 15 faculty members who concurrently
held administrative roles in the Seminary, moved temporarily to Atlanta, GA. Those 15
faculty members were asked to participate in this evaluation. An additional 15 nonadministrative faculty members were randomly selected and asked to participate. The
inclusion of faculty was chosen for three primary reasons. First, the lack of a control
group limited the conclusions made from this study. A benchmark group was not the
same as a control group, but provided some external measure. Second, Kohlberg found
the moral reasoning of teachers directly impacted the moral development of students
(Bar-Yam et al., 1980). An evaluation of faculty moral reasoning served to ascertain what
level of moral reasoning was consistent with the program’s intended outcomes. The third
rationale for including faculty followed from the second rationale. An evaluation of the
moral reasoning of faculty was sought to validate the DIT-2 for this study.

108

Instrumentation

Defining Issues Test 2
The Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) was used as the measurement instrument for
moral judgment. The DIT-2 was a paper-and-pencil instrument, which could be
completed in approximately 45 minutes. The instrument involved five moral dilemmas
presented as stories. The participant read each story and then categorized 12 statements as
to their moral relevance for the dilemma. The DIT-2 was computer scored by the Center
for the Study of Ethical Development.
The theoretical framework of the DIT and DIT-2 was presented as part of the
review of the literature. In brief, the instrument was developed by Rest (1986) based upon
Kohlberg’s (1981) theory of moral development. The DIT and DIT-2 were intended to
provide quantitative scores for the moral judgment of participants.

Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) instrument Form F was used to asses
the personality types of participants. The MBTI instrument was a paper-and-pencil,
multiple-choice instrument. Form F of the MBTI was a longer form, involving 166 items
and was designed for use by researchers. Use of Form F was restricted to researchers
authorized by the Center for Applications of Psychological Type (CAPT). CAPT
authorized the researcher for this program evaluation to use Form F.
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The MBTI’s theoretical framework and relevant research were also discussed as
part of the literature review. Based on the work of Jung, the MBTI instrument was
developed by Myers and Briggs. The results of MBTI assessments included four general
categories of personality with each category including two dichotomies. Participants were
identified with one of the two dichotomies in each category.

Instrument Reliability and Validity

DIT Reliability and Validity
Rest (1986) believed the evidence for a cognitive theory of moral development
was so strong that, “if a person remains skeptical on the point that there are age trends in
moral judgment, it is doubtful that any finding in all of social science will be acceptable”
(pp. 29, 32). One of the fundamental validity traits in Kohlberg’s theory was that
numerous studies had shown stage-progression was age-related. Similarly, early research
of the DIT supported its ability to measure moral development as a factor of cognitive
maturation. According to Rest (1986), “age/education accounts for 30 to 50 percent of the
variance in DIT scores” (p. 176). So, the general theory of a cognitive basis for moral
development was well supported.
Researchers had found the DIT was sufficiently reliable with reliability
coefficients usually in the .70s and .80s (Rest et al., 2000). The DIT had an internal
reliability, using Chronbach’s alpha, of .76, while the shorter DIT-2 increased reliability
to .81. Combining the DIT and DIT-2 increased reliability to .90 but did not yield
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significantly different results (Rest et al., 1999). The reliability of the DIT and DIT-2
were based upon hundreds of thousands of administrations. The DIT and the DIT-2
correlated extremely well with each other (Rest et al., 1999).
The DIT had been validated in terms of cognitive measurement, longitudinal
consistency, age and educational discrimination, reliability and other measures of
professional ethics and social issues through more than 400 studies. Still, the publisher of
the DIT was seeking to gather more data, especially data pertaining to demographic
groups most salient to the DIT construction and theory (Rest et al., 1999). Because this
study concerned the professional preparation of clergy, this research had the potential to
make a valuable contribution to the research literature.
According to Rest (1986), a large percentage of studies involving the DIT used
small sample sizes and often involved no more than a couple dozen participants (Rest,
1986). Literature reviewed for this dissertation included numerous studies with small
sample sizes. Many of the studies included similar, and sometimes smaller, sample sizes
than the number participants surveyed in this research (Ang, 1989; Blizard, 1980; Catoe,
1992; Faqua, 1983; Griffore & Samuels, 1978; Leland, 1990; Nelson, 2004; Watt et al.,
2000). Some studies used negligibly larger sample sizes (Hoagland, 1984; Walters, 1980;
Warren, 1992; Washington, 1999).
This study involved a population of 101 students. The size of the population was
appropriate for the DIT instrument and yielded reliable and valid statistics. The literature
review conducted for this study demonstrated the theoretical validity of the DIT-2 for this
particular evaluation.
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The DIT had been used with Christian populations in numerous studies. Quite
often, Christian populations scored at approximately the national average. Many other
studies had shown Christians to score below average. Christian education, however, was
intended to develop the critical thinking skills consistent with principled reasoning on the
DIT. The DIT was not a perfect measure of Christian morality, as it was not designed for
Christians; however, the DIT did meet the validity requirements for this program
evaluation. Further, the DIT was determined to be the most appropriate measure available
for this research.

MBTI Reliability and Validity
The MBTI instrument was a time-tested instrument with high reliability and
validity. Internal reliability coefficients for middle-aged adults exceeded .90 for each of
the four dichotomies. Test-retest reliabilities were lower but still ranged from the low
.60s to low .80s. The psychological nature of the MBTI caused the instrument to be
susceptible to variations based upon testing conditions (Myers et al., 2003).
The validity of MBTI assessments had been evaluated by comparison with other
psychological measures. For example, the MBTI dichotomies correlated modestly with
corresponding dynamics of the 16 Personality Factors Questionnaire, the California
Psychological Inventory, and the Strong Interest Inventory (Myers et al., 2003).
The MBTI instrument, like the DIT-2, was theoretically based on an assumption
of universal applicability. Further, the MBTI instrument could not report negative results.
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No score on an MBTI report should have been construed as a bad or poor score. All
preferences were considered healthy aspects of human personality (Myers et al., 2003).
Despite the presumption of all types being equal, there were researchers who had
indicated type differences in moral reasoning; however, these findings actually supported
the validity of both the MBTI and the DIT for this program evaluation. Type differences
in moral reasoning largely fit what researchers might logically conclude based upon type
and moral stage descriptions.
The type differences in moral reasoning bore significance on the interpretation of
results for this study. The literature supported a hypothesis that Introvert (I), Sensing (S),
Feeling (F) and Judging (J) preferences would be overrepresented among LSP Seminary
students. The S, F and J preferences were predictive of lower moral reasoning scores. The
tendency of these types to predict lower moral reasoning did not, however, negate the use
of the DIT for this population. Instead, understanding these types allowed better typeappropriate interpretation of DIT scores.

Data Collection
Students in the LSP Seminary program received letters inviting them to
participate in this study. The letters provided informed consent and requested their
signatures indicating whether they did or did not agree to participate. Those students who
agreed to participate completed the DIT-2 and MBTI in a classroom setting at Angola.
Researchers including prisoners as participants needed to be especially conscious of the
particular requirements of Common Rule subpart C. To ensure LSP Seminary students
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did not feel any undue pressure to participate in this study, those students who attended
received informed consent in written form and verbally from the researcher prior to their
completing of the research instruments. LSP guards were not in the classroom during the
research process.
Each participant received an envelope containing the DIT-2 and the MBTI. Each
envelope was marked with a particular participant’s name. The instruments, however,
were only marked with the student’s unique identification number created by the
researcher for this program evaluation. When participants completed the instruments, the
DIT-2, the MBTI, and the envelopes were each returned separately to the researcher. This
method ensured anonymity. Individual students were known only to the researcher; once
documents were returned to the researcher, they were placed in a bag that did not leave
the researcher’s possession at any time in LSP.
The research involving the full-time faculty at the NOBTS main campus was
conducted in accordance with informed consent. To obtain participation from those
faculty members in Atlanta, the researcher delivered the materials to the offices of the
faculty members. The faculty members were requested to complete the DIT-2 and return
the instruments by mail to the researcher. Stamped, addressed envelopes were provided to
each faculty member. The Seminary was not able to provide mailing addresses of those
faculty members not in Atlanta. The researcher, in requesting participation, e-mailed
informed consent information to the 15 randomly selected faculty members. Faculty
members who agreed to participate voluntarily provided current mailing addresses.
Materials, including informed consent letters, were then mailed to participating faculty.
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Data Analysis
The Primary Research Question posed in this study was focused on the extent to
which students in the NOBTS program at LSP developed moral judgment consistent with
program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry. The
question was designed to allow holistic analysis appropriate to this unique faith-based
program evaluation. The analysis for this question was dependent upon answers to the
two sub-questions, Research Question 1a and Research Question 1b.
Research Question 1a inquired as to any statistically significant differences in the
moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level LSP Seminary students.
Data obtained from the DIT-2 P scores and demographic information from the DIT-2
were analyzed. The Center for the Study of Ethical Development provided results in an
SPSS file. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to investigate differences in
dependent variables and the independent variable. Statistical significance was calculated
based upon a probability of Type I error of less than 5 percent.
Research Question 1b addressed any statistically significant relationships
identified between the moral judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality
types. Data obtained from the DIT-2 and MBTI were used in the analysis. Moral
judgment was categorized by P scores. Personality type variables included each of the
eight individual dichotomy designations (I, E, S, N, T, F, J and P), the 16 personality
types (e.g., INTP), the 4 personality temperaments (SJ, SP, NT and NF) and Richardson’s
(1996) four spiritualities (NF, NT, SF and ST). ANOVAs were used to investigate
differences in the dependent variable and the independent variables. Statistical
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significance was calculated based upon a probability of Type I error of less than 5
percent.
The literature reviewed relevant to this program evaluation was limited in
significant areas of content. Little research was available concerning the moral
development of prisoners or the moral development of Baptist seminarians. While
questions of statistical significance could be determined quantitatively, program success
had not been similarly defined.
An evaluation of the program’s effectiveness in facilitating moral development
necessitated consideration of initial moral judgment and the moral judgment of exiting
students, as well as the general progress shown across each year of schooling.
Additionally, an evaluation of the moral development of students included the assessment
of growth respective to personality. Finally, this program evaluation necessitated
consideration of what moral judgment was reasonable and appropriate for this population.
The results of faculty evaluations facilitated creating a benchmark for what moral
judgments were consistent with Baptist theology.

Summary
The LSP Seminary program had existed for a decade and had been credited with
substantial success in the reform of the Angola environment. The program model was
expanding across the state of Louisiana and was now being incorporated into the
correctional programs of other states. No research had been conducted, however, to

116

evaluate this program. The purpose of this dissertation was to evaluate the LSP
Seminary’s success in facilitating moral development of students.

117

CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS

Introduction
This study was conducted during fall of 2005 in order to evaluate the
effectiveness of the LSP Seminary program in achieving the goal of moral development
among students. Students were asked to complete the DIT-2 and MBTI instruments, and
30 NOBTS faculty members were asked to complete the DIT-2.
The LSP Seminary population consisted of 101 students. Of the 101 students in
the program, 95 agreed to complete the DIT-2, for a response rate of 94%, and 98
completed the MBTI instrument, for a response rate of 97%. In addition to the student
responses, 30 full-time NOBTS faculty members were asked to complete the DIT-2. The
contacted faculty members included 15 administrators who held faculty rank and 15 nonadministrative professors. Of the 15 administrative faculty members, four agreed to
participate, for a response rate of 27%. Of the 15 randomly selected non-administrative
faculty members, 2 agreed to participate, for a response rate of 13%. These responses
represented 9% of the total NOBTS full-time faculty.
Response rates for faculty members were low, overall. Because the faculty
member data were to be used only for benchmarking, the response rates were deemed
sufficient for this evaluation. The low response rates might be attributable to the time
requirements of the DIT-2 and the stressors undoubtedly facing faculty members still
recovering from Hurricane Katrina.
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Research Questions
The data from the survey instruments were collected and analyzed to answer a
single Primary Research Question, which was focused on the extent to which students in
the NOBTS program at LSP developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of
rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry. Analysis of the data
gathered to respond to the two sub-questions, Research Question 1a and Research
Question 1b, formed the basis for answering the primary question. The following sections
provide narratives and tabular displays for each of the research sub-questions, which
enable a response to the Primary Research Question.

Research Question 1a
What, if any, statistically significant differences exist in the moral judgment of
freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary students?
To answer this question, the DIT-2 was administered to students who agreed to
participate in this study. The dependent variables investigated were the DIT-2 P scores
and stage scores. The independent variable was the individual student’s class year.
The DIT-2 included an overall P score, as well as scores for the individual’s
likelihood of preferring choices at each of the two lower stages. Stage23 represented
choices based on self-interests. Stage4 represented choices based upon maintaining social
norms. A successful program would ideally increase P scores across time and decrease
Stage23 scores across time. Successful changes in Stage4 scores would be factors for
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students’ levels as they began the program, because Stage4 is a transitory stage between
Stage23 and principled thinking, represented by the P scores.
The DIT-2 included several internal reliability controls. In test administrations, it
was common for 10% or more of the respondents to be disqualified due to internal
reliability checks (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). In this administration, a mere 3% of
respondents were disqualified from the final data due to internal consistency checks. A
final sample size of 92 respondents was included in the analysis of the DIT-2 data,
representing 91% of the entire population and 97% of the participating students. The
independent variable scores for the 92 reported students are shown in Table 5.
To answer Research Question 1a, ANOVAs were conducted for the independent
and dependent variables. The analysis did not achieve statistical significance for any of
the dependent variables. The results for P scores were F(3,88) = 1.2, p >.05; for Stage23
were F(3,88) = 1.0, p > .05; and for Stage4 were F(3,88) = 0.62, p > .05. Results of
ANOVAs did not support the rejection of the null hypothesis. Results of the analysis of
variance for the independent and dependent variables are reported in Table 6.
A visual check of the mean scores revealed an apparent change in scores across
the four years of college. The changes in scores, however, did not achieve statistical
significance. One possible reason for the lack of significance may be wide variances in P
scores. The variances of scores for each class are shown in Table 7. The variances in
freshmen scores were much greater than were the variances in the other years.
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Table 5
Independent Variable Scores for Participating Students by Class Year (N = 92)
Independent Variables
Freshmen
P Score
Stage23
Stage4
Sophomores
P Score
Stage23
Stage4
Juniors
P Score
Stage23
Stage4
Seniors
P Score
Stage23
Stage4
Total
P Score
Stage23
Stage4

N

m

sd

33
33
33

24.5609
26.2012
43.3476

15.14261
13.01753
16.67556

12
12
12

25.5250
22.1883
49.7875

9.06834
9.91914
10.10383

25
25
25

30.2744
22.0032
44.0424

13.16482
10.74928
12.22368

22
22
22

29.2273
21.2955
45.3864

9.84611
13.09185
15.34363

92
92
92

27.3551
23.3639
44.8639

12.84973
12.08941
14.42715

Table 6
Anova Results for the Independent and Dependent Variables
Variables

Variance

SS

P score

Between
Within
Total
Between
Within
Total
Between
Within
Total

588.007
14437.501
15025.508
422.659
12877.331
13299.990
389.654
18551.339
18940.993

Stage23

Stage4

df
3
88
91
3
88
91
3
88
91
121

Mean square

F

Sig.

196.002
164.063

1.195

.317

140.886
146.333

.963

.414

129.885
210.811

.616

.606

Table 7
Minimum, Maximum and Range of Participants’ Scores by Class Year (N = 92)
Class Year
Freshmen

Sophomores

Juniors

Seniors

Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Range

P Score

Stage23

Stage4

.00
66.00
66.00
8.00
38.30
30.30
8.00
54.00
46.00
10.00
48.00
38.00

.00
48.00
48.00
4.26
38.00
33.74
4.08
40.00
35.92
6.00
48.00
42.00

16.00
74.47
58.47
38.00
68.00
30.00
22.00
66.00
44.00
20.00
70.00
50.00

The program evaluator chose to test for statistical outliers to determine if the
variances may have affected statistical significance. This exploration of data was chosen
after the initial tests came close to statistical significance, but did not achieve
significance. SPSS was used to test for outliers, and two outliers were found in the P
scores of the freshmen students. No outliers were found among the other stage scores.
The two freshmen outliers had P scores of 66 and 58. Those P scores would have been
very high scores among the general public and represented the two highest scores in the
entire LSP Seminary sample. These scores approximated those found among students in
theologically liberal seminaries (m = 57.6) and moral philosophy graduate students (m =
64.4) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).
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Outliers, by definition, skew the results of research. The outliers in this research
posed a particular problem for evaluation because they were similar to scores of graduate
students. An undergraduate program is unlikely to significantly improve the moral
reasoning of such students; therefore, the program evaluator chose to conduct ANOVAs
with the two outliers removed from the sample. Table 8 displays the comparison of P
Scores with outliers included and excluded.
Table 8
P Scores: Freshmen and All Participating Students by Class Year
P Scores
Freshmen
P Score with outliers
P Score without outliers

33
31

24.5609
22.1455

15.14261
12.00184

Total
P Score with outliers
P Score without outliers

92
90

27.3551
26.5852

12.84973
11.86991

N

m

sd

Removing the outliers and conducting an analysis of variance of the remaining P
scores resulted in the achievement of statistical significance, F(3,86) = 2.8, p < .05. The
results of the ANOVA are reported in Table 9. With the outliers removed, a statistically
significant difference was found among P scores across the four years of college. A
Tukey post-hoc comparison was conducted. It was determined the differences existed
between the freshmen and junior class years (p < .05).
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Table 9
Analysis of Variance with Outliers Removed (N = 90)
Variance
Between
Within
Total

SS

df

Mean Square

1118.359
11421.267
12539.626

3
86
89

372.786
132.805

F

Sig.

2.807

.044

In response to Research Question 1a, statistical significance was not found among
the data. Although overall significance was not found, an after-the-fact analysis
suggested that significant differences in P scores might be found if outliers were removed
from the sample. The differences in P scores appeared between the freshman and junior
class years.
No statistically significant differences were found in the Stage23 or Stage4 scores
of the Seminary population. A trend of differing scores was observed, however.
Sophomores used Stage23 much less often than freshmen, while sophomores used Stage4
more frequently than freshmen. The more frequent use of Stage4 for sophomores was
consistent with the less frequent use of Stage23. Juniors used Stage4 less frequently than
sophomores. This would be required for continued growth in principled thinking. In total,
mean scores showed inclinations toward Stage23 in the freshman year, Stage4 in the
sophomore year, and principled thinking in the junior year. The changes in Stage23 and
Stage4 scores, however, did not achieve statistical significance.
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Research Question 1b
What, if any, statistically significant differences exist between the moral judgment
of LSP Seminary students of different personality types?
This question was intended to facilitate the interpretation of moral judgment
scores. As reported in Chapter 2, many researchers have found personality types to affect
moral judgment. Further, the personality types typical of prisoners and vocational
ministers were frequently associated with lower levels of moral judgment. Understanding
the personality types of LSP Seminary students and any effects those types had on moral
development would be beneficial to determining the success of the LSP Seminary
program in promoting higher-level moral judgment.
The LSP Seminary population consisted of 101 students, 98 of whom completed
the MBTI instrument. The results of the MBTI administration included classification of
the dichotomy preferences for each participant as well as the classification of each
participant’s overall personality type. The personality type distributions among the
participants are displayed in Table 10. Nearly half (44.9%) of LSP Seminary students
were represented by just two of the sixteen types: ISTJ and ESTJ. This table shows the
self-selection ratio of each category compared with the norms for male college students,
shown in Chapter 2. Self-selection ratio scores above 1.0 indicate over-representation of
the preference among the LSP Seminary population.
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Table 10
Participants’ Personality Type Distributions (N = 98)
Personality Types
ISTJ
ISFJ
INFJ
INTJ
ISTP
ISFP
INFP
INTP
ESTP
ESFP
ENFP
ENTP
ESTJ
ESFJ
ENFJ
ENTJ

N
27
10
1
7
3
4
2
3
1
4
1
2
17
13
0
3

%
27.55
10.20
1.02
6.14
3.06
4.08
2.04
3.06
1.02
4.08
1.02
2.04
17.35
13.27
0.00
2.04

Self-Selection Ratio
2.21
1.88
0.38
1.14
0.45
1.00
0.38
0.46
0.15
0.93
0.16
0.30
1.35
2.43
0.00
0.35

Note. Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) types are comprised of: N=Intuition, S=Sensing, T=Thinking,
F=Feeling, E=Extraverts, I=Introverts, J=Judging, P=Perceiving.

Table 11 displays the distribution of personality dichotomies. The four SensingJudging (S-J) personality types comprised the four most overrepresented types among
Angola students. The four personality types most under-represented among the inmates
were all Intuitive (N) types.
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Table 11
Distribution of Personality Dichotomies (N = 98)
Indicators
Extraversion (E)
Introversion (I)
Intuition (N)
Sensing (S)
Thinking (T)
Feeling (F)
Judging (J)
Perceiving (P)

N
41
57
19
79
63
35
78
20

%
41.84
58.16
19.34
80.61
64.29
35.71
79.59
20.41

Self-Selection Ratio
0.82
1.19
0.46
1.38
1.01
0.98
1.50
0.43

Temperament and Spirituality distributions are shown in Table 12. The most
common Temperament was SJ, represented by 68.37% of the sample. The Introversion
(I), Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences were overrepresented among this sample. As
was shown in Chapter 2, previous researchers found the Sensing and Judging preferences
to be predictors of lower P scores and higher religiosity. Previous researchers have also
found the Introversion and Sensing preferences to be overrepresented among prisoners.
This study supported those previous findings.
Table 12
Participants’ Temperament and Spirituality Distribution (N = 98)
Type
Temperaments
Sensing Judging (SJ)
Sensing Perceiving (SP)
Intuition Thinking (NT)
Intuition Feeling (NF)
Spiritualities
Intuition Feeling (NF)
Intuition Thinking (NT)
Sensing Feeling (SF)
Sensing Thinking (ST)
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N

%

67
12
15
4

68.37
12.24
15.31
4.08

4
15
31
48

4.08
15.31
31.63
48.98

Research Question 1b was designed to provide further evidence needed to
determine the LSP Seminary’s effectiveness in promoting moral development. The data
were analyzed to determine what, if any, statistically significant differences exist in moral
judgment scores based upon personality types. Mean P scores for each dichotomy are
displayed in Table 13. Because several of the 16 personality types were represented by
just one or two students, the researcher chose to not include P score means by types. This
cautious decision was made to ensure confidentiality of assessment results.
The sample size for comparisons of type and P scores was reduced to 91 or 90%
of the population. The sample size for Research Question 1b was smaller than the overall
sample sizes because not all participants agreed to complete both instruments and three
DIT-2 scores were rejected by the internal reliability controls.
Table 13
Mean P Scores for Personality Dichotomies (N = 98)
Indicators
Extraverts
Introverts
Intuition
Sensing
Thinking
Feeling
Judging
Perceiving

N
37
54
18
73
59
32
73
18

m
25.34
28.65
30.99
26.39
28.31
25.45
26.91
28.91

sd
13.40548
12.50986
12.15744
13.00952
11.79711
14.76865
12.24905
15.61170

To answer Research Question 1b, independent t-tests were conducted for each of
the four dichotomies, and ANOVAs were conducted for the four Temperaments and the
four Spiritualities. P scores served as the dependent variables; personality preferences
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were used as independent variables. Mean P scores for each Temperament and
Spirituality are shown in Table 14. No statistically significant differences were found in P
scores based on any of the dichotomies, the Temperaments or the Spiritualities.
Table 14
Participants’ Temperament and Spirituality P Scores
Type
Temperaments
Sensing Judging (SJ)
Sensing Perceiving (SP)
Intuition Thinking (NT)
Intuition Feeling (NF)
Spiritualities
Intuition Feeling (NF)
Intuition Thinking (NT)
Sensing Feeling (SF)
Sensing Thinking (ST)

N

m

sd

63
10
14
4

26.26
27.23
34.00
20.50

12.21948
18.01284
12.07508
4.12311

4
15
31
48

20.50
34.00
26.15
26.54

4.12311
12.07508
15.63310
11.26595

Faculty Data
Since it was necessary to determine what levels of moral reasoning were
consistent with program goals and Baptist theology prior to answering the Primary
Research Question, faculty data were also sought. The researcher chose to ask a sample
of NOBTS full-time faculty members to complete the DIT-2. In addition to the student
responses, 30 full-time NOBTS faculty members were asked to complete the DIT-2.
The faculty members contacted for participation included 15 administrators who
held faculty rank and 15 non-administrative professors. Of the 15 administrative faculty
members, four agreed to participate, for a response rate of 27%. Of the 15 randomly
selected non-administrative faculty members, 2 agreed to participate, for a response rate
of 13%. These responses represented 9% of the total NOBTS full-time faculty.
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Response rates for faculty members were low, overall. Because the faculty
member data were to be used only for benchmarking, the response rates were deemed
sufficient for this evaluation. The low response rates might be attributable to the time
requirements of the DIT-2 and the stressors undoubtedly facing faculty members still
recovering from Hurricane Katrina.
The mean P score of NOBTS faculty members was 34.02 (sd = 15.25). A P score
of 34.02 was lower than the average scores for American adults (m = 42.8) and
Americans with research doctoral degrees who self-reported conservative political views
(m = 43.85) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). A mean of 34.02 was also lower than the mean
score of 35.17 (sd = 11.69) Nelson (2004) reported for Bible college students. Faculty
scores ranged from 12 to 52.

Summary
The analysis of data for Research Questions 1a and 1b has been reported in
Chapter 4 along with relevant data obtained from faculty members. In Chapter 5, the
results of the study, focused around the Primary Research Question, will be addressed.
Chapter 5 will include a summary and discussion of findings. Limitations of the study
and recommendations for future research will also be presented.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction
The purpose of this study was to conduct a program evaluation for the Seminary
at LSP. The Primary Research Question in this study addressed the extent to which
students in the NOBTS program at LSP developed moral judgment consistent with
program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry. Data
gathered in the analysis of Research Questions 1a and 1b, as well as data gathered from
NOBTS full-time faculty members, were useful in formulating a response to the single
larger issue posed in this program evaluation.
Research Question 1a asked what, if any, statistically significant differences exist
in the moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary
students. Differences in P scores did not achieve statistical significance; after removing
two outliers, however, there was some indication that significant differences might exist
between the freshman and junior years.
Research Question 1b asked what, if any, statistically significant differences exist
between the moral judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types. No
statistically significant type differences were found in moral reasoning of LSP Seminary
students. While mean P scores by personality type did reveal some of the hypothesized
differences, such as Intuitive Thinkers (NTs) scoring higher than other types, none of
those differences reached significance.
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In addition to Research Questions 1a and 1b, moral reasoning data were gathered
from several NOBTS faculty members. The mean P score among faculty was 34.02 (sd =
15.25), with scores ranging from 12 to 52. The faculty data were incorporated with other
data to address the Primary Research Question.

Summary and Discussion of Findings for the Primary Research Question
To answer the Primary Research Question, it was necessary to determine what
levels of moral reasoning were consistent with program goals and Baptist theology. In
order to reach this determination, the researcher chose to ask a sample of NOBTS fulltime faculty members to complete the DIT-2.
The mean P score of NOBTS faculty members was 34.02 (sd = 15.25). A P score
of 34.02 was lower than the average scores for American adults (m = 42.8) and
Americans with research doctoral degrees who self-reported conservative political views
(m = 43.85) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). A mean of 34.02 was also lower than the mean
score of 35.17 (sd = 11.69) reported for Bible college students (Nelson, 2004). Faculty
scores ranged from 12 to 52.
Comparisons of students’ scores with various norms constituted a factor in
answering the Primary Research Question. According to Rest (1979b), prisoners had
been found to have a mean P score of 23.5. In this study, the freshman mean P score was
24.56. That score was reduced to 22.15 after removing the outliers. The LSP Seminary
students were determined to have begun the program at approximately the expected level
of moral reasoning. By the junior year, however, the mean P score of students was 30.27.
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In regard to the extent to which students in the NOBTS program at LSP
developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and
preparing them for effective ministry, the researcher concluded differences in P scores
among LSP Seminary students matched expectations for a successful program. Statistical
significance was not achieved with the differences, however, unless outliers were
removed. The differences in the mean P scores of students were greater than those
typically reported in evaluations of college students. Freshman LSP Seminary students
demonstrated at a level of moral reasoning equivalent to middle-income junior high
school students (m = 23.4), while juniors scored equivalent to conservative community
college students (m = 30.75) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).
The results of MBTI assessments were also used to evaluate moral development
respective to program goals. As described in Chapter 2, the demographics of LSP
Seminary students were predictive of personality preferences related to lower levels of
moral reasoning. In fact, preferences for Sensing (S) and Judging (J) were
overrepresented among the LSP Seminary students. Past researchers have correlated the S
and J preferences with lower P scores, and similar results were observed in this
population. Type differences in P scores appeared as predicted with Introverts (I) scoring
higher than Extraverts (E), Intuitives (N) scoring higher than Sensors (S), Thinkers (T)
scoring higher than Feelers (F) and Perceivers (P) scoring higher than Judgers (J).
Differences in mean P scores by preferences, however, did not meet the standard for less
than 5% chance of Type I error. This means the relationship between moral development
and personality type may be due to random error.
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Despite the MBTI data failing to meet statistical significance, the data did fit the
limited research available concerning other incarcerated men. The data also fit the
findings of previous researchers who investigated personality and moral development.
Therefore, while acknowledging the statistical chance results were caused by random
error, it is reasonable to conclude LSP Seminary students do typically have personality
preferences related to lower moral reasoning.
To answer the Primary Research Question, the results of Research Questions 1a
and 1b were combined with the results of faculty evaluations. The analysis of Research
Question 1a was not statistically significant unless two outliers were removed from the
freshmen scores. The data observed matched expectations and after removing outliers
there was an indication that statistically significant differences might exist among the
class years. Further, the differences in moral reasoning were socially meaningful.
Freshmen demonstrated moral reasoning typical of prisoners and junior high school
students, while juniors demonstrated reasoning more typical of conservative community
college students. Further, upper-level students used moral reasoning similar to some
faculty members.
The moral reasoning of teachers was a powerful influence on the moral
development of students (Bar-Yam et al., 1980). Freshman LSP Seminary students
demonstrated a mean P score approximately 12 points below the mean score for faculty.
The mean P score for juniors, however, was just 4 points below the mean for faculty.
According to Rest (1974), any program that could result in even modest moral
gains among the “extremely problematic” population of prison inmates would be
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“spectacular” (p. 250). In this study, the differences in moral reasoning found among LSP
Seminary students were larger than those typical for college students. This evaluation,
however, was only a cross-sectional study and the results cannot be generalized beyond
this sample. Much more research is needed before reasonable claims may be made
concerning program success. This study should be an impetus for such research.

Study Limitations
The use of faculty scores had significant limitations. The faculty invited to
participate included full-time faculty on the Seminary’s main campus. Some of those
faculty members had taught at LSP, while others had not taught at LSP. Some LSP
courses had been taught by adjunct faculty. Further, the main campus of NOBTS offers
several majors not offered at LSP; some main campus faculty taught in curricular majors,
such as music and women’s ministry, that were not part of the Angola program.
Consequently, the faculty scores provided inferential evidence, at best, for the teaching at
Angola. Finally, the response rate of faculty invited to participate was sufficiently low to
raise reasonable doubt as to the generalizability of scores. The wide range of P scores
among faculty members made generalizability even more difficult.
Despite the limitations of the faculty data, the researcher believed faculty scores
were valuable as a secondary source of information for evaluating the effectiveness of the
LSP Seminary program. The faculty data were not essential to measuring the moral
development of LSP students, but the faculty data were used to better understand the
nature of the moral reasoning consistent with the LSP Seminary’s goals.
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Implications for Policy and Practice
This study stood to fill a gap in research. The Seminary at LSP had been in
operation for a decade without a significant program evaluation. No research had been
conducted on the LSP Seminary program and little research had been conducted
concerning moral rehabilitation of prisoners or the personality types of prisoners.
Consequently, the praise given to the program by correctional officials, Seminary
officials and the media was based largely on anecdotal information. Even with this study
completed, more research is warranted for the program. Research is especially warranted
in light of the program model’s expansion into other states. This study should serve as an
impetus for new research, which may help investigators support or refine the conclusions
reported in this study.
At the present time, this study may serve policy-makers and stakeholders as
evidence that continued support for this program is defensible. Perhaps more importantly,
this study may provide necessary details for improving the program curriculum and
achievement of student-learning outcomes.
One of the best ways for students to develop higher levels of moral judgment is to
be exposed to higher-level reasoning. Because the faculty members scored higher, on
average, than students, the faculty could potentially teach at levels above student
reasoning. Such teaching would be conducive to development of students’ moral
reasoning. At the same time, the relatively low scores of faculty could pose a practical,
and rather low, limit for student development. Course curricula, including exposure to
philosophical and theological texts, may provide additional opportunities for students to
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be exposed to principled thinking. Further, the wide range of scores found among
students could allow significant moral dialogue inside and outside of classes.
Public policy addressing prisoner rehabilitation was important considering
America’s high rate of incarceration. Previous researchers often found little gain from
prison education and the federal government discontinued support for post-secondary
prisoner education. The LSP Seminary program may provide a model for how prison
rehabilitation might be successful.

Recommendations for Future Research
This dissertation was narrowly focused on the single program goal of moral
development. That focus was chosen because it was an often-cited goal of the program
and had significant saliency for correctional leaders, policymakers, stakeholders, and the
public. An LSP Seminary program evaluation could have been targeted at numerous
other goals. Further research is warranted for the Angola program.
Because this dissertation was a cross-sectional study involving students from the
fall 2005 semester, conclusions cannot be generalized beyond the specific sample. A
longitudinal investigation may be especially beneficial in the case of the LSP Seminary.
This researcher found a wide range of scores among students in each of the four class
years; further, the two highest scores were found among freshmen. A longitudinal study
might allow more accurate assessment of students’ moral development.
A longitudinal study would allow assessment of how a student’s moral reasoning
at entry into the program affects the student’s moral reasoning as a senior or at
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graduation. Those entering with low scores have ample room for improvement during the
college years. Conversely, this researcher can provide no indication what might happen to
the two freshmen whose P scores were already extremely high. If Richards (1991) was
correct, and Christian college students learn to reject higher levels of reasoning, the
outliers’ scores might actually decrease. This possibility seemed especially significant
considering many students scored higher than most faculty members.
Although a very low percentage of Angola inmates are released from
incarceration, an investigation of program gradates’ recidivism could shed light on
whether the moral development of students relates to improvements in behavior. The DIT
was a measure of moral reasoning, rather than moral action. There was evidence the LSP
environment had changed from frequent violence to relative calm during the years the
Seminary has been operating at LSP. No definite connection can be made, however,
between behavioral changes among Angola residents and the moral development of LSP
Seminary students.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINING ISSUES TEST 2

139

This questionnaire is concerned with how you define the issues in a social
problem. Several stories about social problems will be described. After each story, there
will be a list of questions. The questions that follow each story represent different issues
that might be raised by the problem. In other words, the questionnaire/issues raise
different ways of judging what is important in making a decision about the social
problem. You will be asked to rate and rank the questions in terms of how important each
one seems to you.
This questionnaire is in two parts; one part contains the INSTRUCTIONS (this
part) and the stories presenting the social problems; the other part contains the questions
(issues) and the ANSWER SHEET on which to write your responses.
Here is an example of the task:
Presidential Election
Imagine that you are about to vote for a candidate for the Presidency of the United
States. Imagine that before you vote, you are given several questions, and asked which
issue is the most important to you in making up your mind about which candidate to vote
for. In this example, 5 items are given. On a rating scale of 1 to 5 (1=Great, 2=Much,
3=Some, 4=Little, 5=No) please rate the importance of the item (issue) by filling in with
a pencil one of the bubbles on the answer sheet by each item.
Assume that you thought that item #1 (below) was of great importance, item #2
had some importance, item #3 had no importance, item #4 had much importance, and
item #5 had much importance. Then you would fill in the bubbles on the answer sheet as
shown below.
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NO

LITTLE

SOME

MUCH

GREAT
X

X
X
X
X

Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)
1. Financially are you personally better off now than you were
four years ago?
2. Does one candidate have a superior personal moral
character?
3. Which candidate stands the tallest?
4. Which candidate would make the best world leader?
5. Which candidate has the best ideas for our country’s
internal problems, like crime and health care?

Further, the questionnaire will ask you to rank the question in terms of
importance. In the space below, the numbers at the top, 1 through 12, represent the item
number. From top to bottom, you are asked to fill in the bubble that represents the item in
first importance (of those given to you to choose from), then second most important, third
most important, and fourth most important. Please indicate your top four choices. You
might fill out this part, as follows:
_1_ Most important item _5_ Second most important
_4_ Third most important _2_ Fourth most important
Note that some of the items may seem irrelevant to you (as in item #3) or not
make sense to you—in that case, rate the item as “no” importance and do not rank the
item. Note that in the stories that follow, there will be 12 items for each story, not five.
Please make sure to consider all 12 items (questions) that are printed after each story.
In addition you will be asked to state your preference for what action to take in
the story. After the story, you will be asked to indicate the action you favor on a sevenpoint scale (1= strongly favor some action, 7=strongly oppose the action).
In short, read the story from this booklet, then fill out your answers on the answer
sheet. Please use a #2 pencil. If you change your mind about a response, erase the pencil
mark cleanly and enter your new response.
[Notice the second part of this questionnaire, the Answer Sheet. The Identification
Number at the top of the answer sheet may already be filled in when you receive your
materials. If not, you will receive instructions about how to fill in the number. If you have
questions about the procedure, please ask now.
Please turn now to the Answer Sheet]
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Famine—(Story #1)
The small village in northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but
this year’s famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to feed themselves
by making soup from tree bark. Mustaq Singh’s family is near starvation. He has heard
that a rich man in his village has supplies of food stored away and is hoarding food while
its price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq is desperate
and thinks about stealing some food from the rich man’s warehouse. The small amount of
food that he needs for his family probably wouldn’t even be missed.
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NO

LITTLE

SOME

MUCH

GREAT

What should Mustaq Singh do? Do you favor the action of taking the food (Mark one.)
___ Should take the food
___ Can’t decide
___ Should not take the food

Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)
1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught
for stealing?
2. Isn’t it only natural for a lovin g father to care so much for
his family that he would steal?
3. Shouldn’t the community’s laws be upheld?
4. Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup
from tree bark?
5. Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when
other people are starving?
6. Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to
steal for his family?
7. What values are going to be the basis for social
cooperation?
8. Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with t he culpability
of stealing?
9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so
greedy?
10. Isn’t private property an institution to enable the rich to
exploit the poor?
11. Would stealing bring about more total good for
everybody concerned or wouldn’t it?
12. Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of
any member of a society?

From the list above, select the four most important:
___ Most important item ___ Second most important
___ Third most important ___ Fourth most important
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Reporter—(Story #2)
Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the Gazette newspaper for over a
decade. Almost by accident, she learned that one of the candidates for Lieutenant
Governor for her state, Grover Thompson, had been arrested for shop-lifting 20 years
earlier. Reporter Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate Thompson had
undergone a confused period and done things he later regretted, actions which would be
very out -of-character now. His shop-lifting had been a minor offense and charges had
been dropped by the department store. Thompson has not only straightened himself out
since then, but built a distinguished record in helping many people and in leading
constructive community projects. Now, Reporter Dayton regards Thompson as the best
candidate in the field and likely to go on to important leadership positions in the state.
Reporter Dayton wonders whether or not she should write the story about Thompson’s
earlier troubles because in the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a
news story could wreck Thompson’s chance to win.
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NO

LITTLE

SOME

MUCH

GREAT

Do you favor the action of reporting the story? (Mark one.)
___ Should report the story
___ Can’t decide
___ Should not report the story

Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)
1. Doesn’t the public have a right to know all the facts about
all candidates for office?
2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton’s
reputation for investigative reporting?
3. If Dayton doesn’t publish the story wouldn’t another
reporter get the story anyway and get the credit for
investigative reporting?
4. Since the voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any
difference what reporter Dayton does?
5. Hasn’t Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a
better person than in his earlier days as a shop-lifter?
6. What would best serve society?
7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it?
8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to
report the damaging story about candidate Thompson?
9. Does the right of “habeas corpus” apply in this case?
10. Would the election process be more fair with or without
reporting the story?
11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in
the same way by reporting everything she learns about them,
good and bad?
12. Isn’t it a reporter’s duty to report all the news regardless
of the circumstances?

From the list above, select the four most important:
___ Most important item ___ Second most important
___ Third most important ___ Fourth most important
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School Board—(Story #3)
Mr. Grant has been elected to School Board District 190 and was chosen to be
Chairman. The district is bitterly divided over the closing of one of the high schools. One
of the high schools has to be closed for financial reasons, but there is no agreement over
which school to close. During his election to the School Board, Mr. Grant had proposed a
series of “Open Meetings” in which members of the community could voice their
opinions. He hoped that the dialogue would make the community realize the necessity of
closing one high school. Also he hoped that through open discussions, the difficulty of
the decision would be appreciated, and that the community would ultimately support the
school board decision. The first Open Meeting was a disaster. Passionate speeches
dominated the microphones and threatened violence. The meeting barely closed without
fist-fights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening phone calls.
Mr. Grant wonder if he ought to call off the next Open Meeting.
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NO

LITTLE

SOME

MUCH

GREAT

Do you favor calling off the next Open Meeting? (Mark one.)
___ Should call of the next open meeting
___ Can’t decide
___ Should have the next open meeting

Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)
1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have Open Meetings on
major school board decisions?
2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign
promises to the community by discounting the Open
Meetings?
3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grant if
he stopped the Open Meetings?
4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment?
5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have
the legal authority to protect the Board by making decisions
in closed meetings?
6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he
stopped the open meetings?
7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for
ensuring that divergent views are heard?
8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers
from the meetings or prevent them from making long
speeches?
9. Are some people deliberately undermining the school
board process by playing some sort of power game?
10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the
community’s ability to handle controversial issues in the
future?
11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads, and is
the community in general really fair-minded and democratic?
12. What is the likelihood that a good decision could be made
without open discussion from the community?

From the list above, select the four most important:
___ Most important item ___ Second most important
___ Third most important ___ Fourth most important

147

Cancer—(Story #4)
Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases of colon cancer. She is in
terrible pain and asks the doctor to give her more pain -killer medicine. The doctor has
given her the maximum safe dose already and is reluctant to increase the dosage because
it would probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational mental state, Mrs. Bennett says
that she realizes this, but wants to end her suffering even if it means ending her life.
Should the doctor give her an increased dosage?

148

NO

LITTLE

SOME

MUCH

GREAT

Do you favor the action of giving more medicine? (Mark one.)
___ Should give Mrs. Bennett an increased dosage to make her die
___ Can’t decide
___ Should not give her an increased dosage

Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)
1. Isn’t the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody
else if giving an overdose would be the same as killing her?
2. Wouldn’t society be better off without so many laws about
what doctors can and cannot do?
3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally
responsible for malpractice?
4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get
more painkiller medicine?
5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug?
6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence
on those who don’t want to live?
7. Is helping to end another’s life ever a responsible act of
cooperation?
8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett
by giving the medicine or not?
9. Wouldn’t the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett
so much drug that she died?
10. Should only God decide when a person’s life should end?
11. Shouldn’t society protect everyone against being killed?
12. Where should society draw the line between protecting
life and allowing someone to die if the person wants to?

From the list above, select the four most important:
___ Most important item ___ Second most important
___ Third most important ___ Fourth most important
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Demonstration—(Story #5)
Political and economic instability in a South America country prompted the
President of the United States to send troops to “police” the area. Students at many
campuses in the U.S.A. have protested that the United States is using its military might
for economic advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil multinational
companies are pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if it means
loss of life. Students at one campus took to the streets in demonstration, tying up traffic
and stopping regular business in the town. The president of the university demanded that
the students stop their illegal demonstrations. Students then took over the college’s
administration building, completely paralyzing the college. Are the students right to
demonstrate in these ways?
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NO

LITTLE

SOME

MUCH

GREAT

Do you favor the action of demonstrating in this way?
___ Should continue demonstrating in these ways
___ Can’t decide
___ Should not continue demonstrating in these ways

Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)
1. Do the students have the right to take over property that
doesn’t belong to them?
2. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and
fined, and even expelled from school?
3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they doing
it just for fun?
4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will
it lead to more disorder?
5. Will the public blame all students for the actions of a few
student demonstrators?
6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed of
the multinational oil companies?
7. Why should a few people like Presidents and business
leaders have more power than ordinary people?
8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less
good in the long run to all people?
9. Can the students justify their civil disobedience?
10. Shouldn’t the authorities be respected by students?
11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of
justice?
12. Isn’t it everyone’s duty to obey the law, whether one
likes it or not?

From the list above, select the four most important:
___ Most important item ___ Second most important
___ Third most important ___ Fourth most important
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APPENDIX B: STUDENT INFORMED CONSENT LETTER
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Bruce M. Sabin
[address]
[date]
Dear Leavell College student:
I graduated from Leavell College in 2000 and I am now a student at the University of Central Florida. With
the support of my advisor, Dr. LeVester Tubbs, I am working on a research project for my degree. I am
asking for your help with my research.
The purpose of my research is to learn about your college program at Angola. If you agree to participate,
you will complete two surveys. I will visit your class later this semester. The students who volunteer to
participate will complete two surveys at that time. You do not have to participate in my surveys, and if you
agree to participate now, you are free to change your mind later.
The first survey is called the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2). This survey asks for your thoughts concerning
how to handle social problems. You and your fellow students can provide important information on those
topics because you are preparing to become leaders in your community. The DIT-2 will take about 45
minutes. The DIT-2 was written to understand how different people think about social problems.
Various people around the country and in many walks of life have responded to the DIT-2. It is important
for you to know the DIT-2 asks questions about difficult social problems. But, that is why I think it is
important to understand how community leaders like you think about these issues. If you agree to take the
survey, you may choose not to answer any questions you do not want to answer. If you want to talk about
the issues after the survey, there are people, such as your chaplains, professors and ministers, who would be
available to you.
The second survey is called the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). The MBTI is designed to help
people understand their own natural personalities and how God has made us. The MBTI will probably take
about 30 minutes of your time. Later this year, I will visit Angola again to give a workshop to those
students who participated in the MBTI. At the workshop, students will learn about the results of the MBTI
and how learning about personalities can help us understand ourselves and others, especially in terms of our
ministries. That workshop will take about 4 hours. Even if you agree to participate in my surveys, you do
not have to come to the workshop. If you agree to come, though, I think you will have a good time and
learn a lot. The workshop will be my way of thanking your for your help.
If you agree to participate, you will complete the surveys during your regular class time. Participating in
my research is not required by your college or your class and will not affect your grades or any other
status at Angola. This is completely voluntary to help me with my research project. The only direct benefit
for you may be the opportunity to learn about personalities during the workshop later in the year. No other
compensation is offered for your participation.
I will respect your privacy and will keep your personal survey responses absolutely private. I will keep
your individual survey responses in a secure place. Only I will see your personal answers to the surveys.
Any results of my research seen by other people at the College or Angola will be general information about
students in the program, not about you personally. The surveys you complete will not have your name on
them. Instead of a name, they will have a special number I create for you and that only I can connect to you
personally. I will keep your personal information completely confidential.
Remember, whether or not you agree to help with this research is completely up to you. If you agree now,
you can always change your mind later. And even when taking the surveys, you will not have to answer
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any questions you do not want to answer. If you choose not to participate, you will be able to study in the
library during the surveys.
Please check the box for whether you would like to participate or would not like to participate. I have also
asked whether you would be willing to let me contact you in the future for other research projects. If you
agree to let me contact you in the future, you are only agreeing to let me contact you and you are not
making any promise to participate in those projects. If I contact you in the future, you will again have the
opportunity to volunteer to participate or choose not to participate in those future projects. Please check the
box for whether you agree to let me contact you again, or would rather not be contacted again. Then, sign
and date the letter and return it to Dr. Robson, who is collecting these for me. I have also provided an extra
copy of this letter for you to keep.
If you have any questions, you may ask Dr. Robson, who can pass the questions along to me, or you can
write to me directly at the address below me name. You may also contact the University of Central
Florida’s Institutional Review Board with any questions about your rights in this research. The Board’s
address is: the UCFIRB office, University of Central Florida Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center,
12443 Research Parkway, Suite 302, Orlando, FL 32826.
Thank you very much for your time.
Sincerely,
Bruce M. Sabin
[address]
Do you volunteer to participate in this research project?
 I have read the information above and I voluntarily agree to participate in
the research. I have also received a copy of this letter.
 I have read the information above and I choose not to participate in the
research. I have also received a copy of this letter.
May I contact you in the future about other research projects?
 I voluntarily agree to give permission to be contacted in the future for other
research projects.
 I choose not to give permission to be contacted about future research projects.
______________________________________
Signature

___________________
Date
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Bruce M. Sabin
[address]
(h) [home telephone number]
(w) [work telephone number]
[e-mail address]
[date]
Dear Dr. [name]:
I graduated from Leavell College in 2000 and I am now a doctoral student at the University of Central
Florida. With the support of my advisor, Dr. LeVester Tubbs, I am working on working on my dissertation,
which is a study an evaluation of Leavell’s Angola campus. I am asking for your help with my research.
In my research, I am using the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) to investigate the moral reasoning of the
Angola students. In order to establish a benchmark for students, I would like you and other NOBTS faculty
to complete the DIT-2. I am presuming you and your colleagues represent the highest standards of Baptist
thinking on moral issues.
The DIT-2 is a paper-and-pencil survey and should take between 30 and 45 minutes. I realize that is a
substantial amount of your time, but I hope you will contribute to my research. Of course, your
participation is completely voluntary.
Enclosed with this letter is the DIT-2 question booklet, an answer sheet, and a return envelope. If you
choose to participate, please complete the DIT-2 and return the documents, including this informed consent
letter, in the provided envelope. The answer sheet has a unique identification number I created for you.
Only I can connect your number with your answers, and I will keep your results completely confidential.
Any results reported will be in the form of aggregated data. Enclosed with these documents, I have also
included a copy of this letter for you to keep. If you choose not to participate, I hope you will still complete
this informed consent letter and return the incomplete documents.
If you have any questions, please contact me at the telephone number or address information at the top of
this letter. Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be directed to the UCFIRB office,
University of Central Florida Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite
207, Orlando, FL 32826.
Thank you very much for your time.
Sincerely,
Bruce M. Sabin
Leavell College ’00




I have read the information above and I voluntarily agree to participate in the
research. I have also received a copy of this letter.
I have read the information above and I choose not to participate in the
research. I have also received a copy of this letter.

______________________________________
Signature

___________________
Date
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Case
Freshmen
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
Sophomores
201
202
203
204

P Score

Stage23

Stage4

0.0
2.0
8.0
8.5
12.0
12.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
18.0
18.0
18.0
18.0
20.0
20.0
22.0
22.0
22.0
22.0
22.0
24.0
24.0
24.0
28.0
30.0
36.0
36.0
40.0
42.0
46.0
50.0
58.0
66.0

48.0
48.0
34.0
10.6
42.0
28.0
20.0
32.0
22.0
16.0
40.0
12.0
26.0
14.0
18.0
20.0
32.0
38.0
22.0
46.0
24.0
32.0
24.0
48.0
30.0
0.0
34.0
6.0
34.0
6.0
26.0
24.0
8.0

50.0
38.0
48.0
74.5
32.0
56.0
68.0
42.0
48.0
50.0
42.0
70.0
48.0
66.0
52.0
58.0
46.0
30.0
56.0
20.0
52.0
44.0
46.0
16.0
24.0
64.0
16.0
50.0
22.0
40.0
22.0
18.0
22.0

8.0
16.0
16.0
22.0

24.0
24.0
38.0
38.0

68.0
56.0
40.0
40.0

158

Case
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

P Score
24.0
24.0
28.0
28.0
32.0
34.0
36.0
38.3

Stage23
12.0
28.0
22.0
14.0
18.0
26.0
18.0
4.3

Stage4
60.0
38.0
50.0
58.0
50.0
40.0
40.0
57.5

Juniors
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325

8.0
16.0
16.0
16.0
18.0
20.0
20.0
22.0
22.0
24.0
24.0
26.0
28.0
28.0
30.0
32.0
36.0
36.0
38.0
42.9
46.0
48.0
52.0
54.0
54.0

40.0
24.0
18.0
20.0
22.0
36.0
26.0
34.0
12.0
34.0
14.0
18.0
36.0
28.0
16.0
40.0
34.0
20.0
16.0
4.1
8.0
16.0
18.0
6.0
10.0

50.0
54.0
66.0
60.0
42.0
42.0
52.0
40.0
64.0
42.0
62.0
56.0
32.0
42.0
50.0
26.0
30.0
40.0
36.0
53.1
42.0
34.0
22.0
34.0
30.0

Seniors
401
402
403

10.0
14.0
22.0

22.0
38.0
16.0

62.0
46.0
44.0
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Case
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422

P Score
22.0
22.0
22.0
22.0
25.0
26.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
30.0
30.0
32.0
36.0
40.0
40.0
44.0
46.0
48.0

Stage23
8.0
10.0
6.0
14.0
32.5
40.0
12.0
28.0
8.0
42.0
10.0
48.0
14.0
30.0
34.0
12.0
24.0
12.0
8.0
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Stage4
56.0
66.0
70.0
64.0
42.5
34.0
54.0
44.0
64.0
26.0
54.0
20.0
52.0
24.0
20.0
48.0
28.0
42.0
38.0
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